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CORPORATIONS CAN KILL TOO: AFTER FILM
RECOVERY, ARE INDIVIDUALS ACCOUNTABLE
FOR CORPORATE CRIMES?
Practical convenience rather than theoretical considerations
have, from the days of the Year Books onward, determined what
activities are possible, and what are impossible to a corporation.*
I. INTRODUCTION
On February 10, 1983, Stefan Golab, an employee of Film Recovery
Systems, Inc. (ERS), died from cyanide poisoning at the company's silver
reclamation plant in Elk Grove Village, Illinois.' In a revolutionary se-
ries of events,2 the Cook County prosecutor sought and received the in-
* 9 W. HOLDSWORTH, A HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW 52 (1926).
1. Report of Proceedings at 5, People v. Film Recovery Syst., Inc., No. 83-11091 (Cook
County Cir. Ct. of Ill. June 14, 1985) consolidated with People v. O'Neil, No. 84-5064 (Cook
County Cir. Ct. of Ill. June 14, 1985). For the facts and verdict, see infra notes 87-116 and
accompanying text.
2. People v. Film Recovery Syst., Inc., Nos. 83-11091, 84-5064 (Cook County Cir. Ct. of
Ill. June 14, 1985), is the first case in which officers and high managerial personnel have been
indicted and tried for homicide, although there have been previous attempts to do so. See, e.g.,
People v. Warner-Lambert Co., 51 N.Y.2d 295, 414 N.E.2d 660, 434 N.Y.S.2d 159 (1980),
cert. denied, 450 U.S. 1031 (1981). In Warner-Lambert, New York's highest court dismissed
an indictment against a corporation and its officers and high managerial personnel for the
death of six employees in an explosion in the company's chewing gum manufacturing plant.
The court dismissed the indictment because the triggering cause of the explosion was "neither
foreseen nor foreseeable." Id. at 298, 414 N.E.2d at 661, 434 N.Y.S.2d at 160. For a discus-
sion of the facts and holding of Warner-Lambert, see infra notes 63-72 & 132-35 and accompa-
nying text.
In the recently decided case of State v. Autumn Hills Convalescent Nursing Home, No.
85-CR-2526 (Bexar Cty. Ct. of Tex. Apr. 2, 1986) (dismissed because of hung jury), both the
business entity, a nursing home, individuals, and five current and former employees, were
charged with the murder by neglect of an elderly patient. See also L.A. Daily J., Oct. 1, 1985,
at 5, col. 3. Individual defendants included the corporation's president, vice-president and
other high level personnel. N.Y. Times, Dec. 22, 1985, at 11, col. 1. In People v. Landis, No.
391583 (Los Angeles Mun. Ct. of Cal. filed Dec. 20, 1983), a highly publicized Los Angeles
case, a fim director and several production crew members were charged with manslaughter as
a result of the deaths of three actors on a movie set. See also Spiegel, The Liability of Corporate
Officers, 71 A.B.A. J., Nov. 1985, at 48, 50.
Cases which attempt to fix criminal liability on corporate officers are not limited to state
courts. In Orlando, Florida, the owner of four companies which engaged in hazardous waste
disposal was indicted in federal court under the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act of
1976, 42 U.S.C.A. §§ 6901-6987 (West 1983 & Supp. 1986), for "knowingly placing employees
in danger of death or serious bodily injury," by causing the illegal disposal of chemical wastes
and the mislabeling of waste containers with intent to defraud other businesses and state and
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dictment of three corporations3 for manslaughter,4 and five corporate
officers or high managerial personnel for murderi The trial court judge
rendered a guilty verdict.' A notice of appeal has been filed.'
Historically, attempts to indict a corporation for homicide were fu-
tile. In the nineteenth century, however, several jurisdictions indicted
corporations for their crimes,9 even violent crimes such as homicide.' 0
federal agencies. United States v. Greer, No. 85-105-CR-ORL-18 (M.D. Fla. filed Dec. 17,
1985). See also N.Y. Times, Dec. 19, 1985, at 14, col. 5.
The guilty verdict in Film Recovery has prompted other prosecutors to take action against
corporations and individuals for employee deaths. Middleton, Prosecutors Get Tough On
Safety, Nat'l L.J., Apr. 21, 1986, at 1, col. 1. In Austin, Texas, two companies and their
officers are awaiting trial on charges of criminally negligent homicide. The charges resulted
from the deaths of three employees in trench cave-ins. State v. Peabody Southwest Inc., No.
259,254 (Travis County Ct. of Tex. filed Nov. 22, 1985); State v. Sabine Consol. Inc., No.
259,257 (Travis County Ct. of Tex. filed Nov. 22, 1985). In Los Angeles, District Attorney Ira
K. Reiner instituted a procedure in which an attorney and an investigator are being sent to the
scene of every industrial-workplace death. Middleton, supra. The first case under the new
policy has been filed: In People v. Maggio, No. A780779 (Los Angeles Mun. Ct. Mar. 26,
1986), a corporation and its president are charged with involuntary felony-manslaughter fol-
lowing the suffocation of an employee while drilling a 33-foot deep elevator shaft, with evi-
dence showing that he had no safety harness. Middleton, supra, at 8, col. I (quoting John
Lynch, Los Angeles Deputy District Attorney).
3. The corporations were Film Recovery Systems, Inc., Stefan Golab's employer; Metal-
lic Marketing Systems, Inc., a sister corporation; and B.R. MacKay & Sons, Inc., a private
silver refinery and a shareholder in the two other defendant corporations. Siegel, Murder Case
a Corporate Landmark, L.A. Times, Sept. 15, 1985, pt. I, at 9, col. 2, at 8, col. 2.
4. For the Illinois statute defining voluntary manslaughter, see infra note 118. For the
Illinois statute defining involuntary manslaughter, see infra note 119.
5. For the Illinois statute defining murder, see infra note 117. All the defendants were
also indicted for 14 counts of reckless conduct. For the Illinois statute defining reckless con-
duct, see infra note 124. For a list of the individual defendants and their relationship with the
corporate defendants, see infra notes 110-14 and accompanying text.
6. Report of Proceedings at 5, Film Recovery.
7. See infra note 157.
8. At common law, courts refused to indict corporations for any crimes. Case 935,
Anonymous, 88 Eng. Rep. 1518 (1701). No facts are related in the opinion of this early case,
but its author stated the common law rule plainly and succinctly: "Corporation not indicta-
ble." Id. Another early English case held that a corporation could not be indicted for man-
slaughter. See Rex v. Cory Bros. Ltd., 136 L.T.R. 735 (1927) (illogical to hold corporation
responsible for personal violence). See generally Recent Case Notes-Corporations-Criminal
Responsibility-Homicide, 37 YALE L.J. 118, 118-19 (1927).
9. See, e.g., United States v. Union Supply Co., 215 U.S. 50 (1909) (willful breach of
duties imposed on oleomargarine dealers); New York Cent. & Hudson River R.R. v. United
States, 212 U.S. 481 (1909) (violation of Elkins Act); United States v. American Socialist
Soc'y, 260 F. 885 (S.D.N.Y. 1919) (violation of Espionage Act), aftid, 266 F. 212 (2d Cir.),
cert. denied, 254 U.S. 637 (1920); Joplin Mercantile Co. v. United States, 213 F. 926 (8th Cir.
1914) (conspiracy to transport liquor into Indian territory), afid, 236 U.S. 531 (1915); United
States v. Young & Holland Co., 170 F. 110 (C.C.R.I. 1909) (conspiracy to conceal bankrupt's
assets); United States v. New York Herald Co., 159 F. 296 (C.C.S.D.N.Y. 1907) (knowingly
mailing obscene materials); Chicago, Wilmington & Vermilion Coal Co. v. People, 214 Ill. 421,
73 N.E. 770 (1905) (conspiracy to violate antitrust laws); Telegram Newspaper Co. v. Com-
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Generally, these jurisdictions have relied on three theories to attach lia-
bility to a corporation for the acts and conduct of its agents. The first
holds a corporation, as principal, responsible for the conduct of its
agents. 1 The second holds a corporation responsible for the conduct of
its policy-making officials, but not for the acts of its lower-level employ-
ees."2 The final theory maintains that a corporation is liable for the acts
of its agents and employees only when the corporation's procedures and
practices unreasonably fail to prevent corporate criminal violations. 3
Illinois common law traditionally held that an accomplice could not
be punished more severely than his corporate principal.' 4 In response to
these common law decisions, which gave corporate entities and officers
monwealth, 172 Mass. 294, 52 N.E. 445 (1899) (contempt of court); State v. White, 96 Mo.
App. 34, 69 S.W. 684 (1902) (willfully and knowingly obstructing a road); State v. Lehigh
Valley R.R., 90 N.J.L. 372, 103 A. 685 (1917) (manslaughter). At common law, however, a
corporation could not be indicted for felonies or misdemeanors. See, e.g., People v. Strong,
363 Ill. 602, 2 N.E.2d 942 (1936) (corporate officers cannot be prosecuted as either principals
or accessories because corporation not indictable for embezzlement). See also infra notes 40-
79 and accompanying text.
10. See, e.g., State v. Lehigh Valley R.R., 90 N.J.L. 372, 103 A. 685 (1917) (corporation
can commit manslaughter); People v. Ebasco Servs., Inc., 77 Misc. 2d 784, 354 N.Y.S.2d 807
(1974) (court recognized that corporation may commit homicide); but see State v. Pacific Pow-
der Co., 226 Or. 502, 360 P.2d 530 (1961) (corporation may not commit involuntary man-
slaughter as that crime is defined by statute). See also Annot., 83 A.L.R.2d 1117 (1962),
superceded by 45 A.L.R.4th 1021 (1986) (available on LEXIS) and cases cited therein dealing
with isolated acts by the corporation. However, Russell Mokhiber, a staff attorney with the
Corporate Accountability Research Group, wrote:
The executives responsible for the recent corporate catastrophes popularly
known as Agent Orange, asbestos, and the Dalkon Shield are not in jail and will not
go to jail. With the exception of informed victims, few of us describe these cases in
the language of crime, even though in each case there is a wealth of evidence that
victims were put at unacceptably high levels of risk of severe injury and death and
that corporate executives knew of the risks, yet failed to take appropriate preventive
action.
Mokhiber, Greedy Corporations: Criminals by Any Other Name, L.A. Daily J., Feb. 28, 1986,
at 4, col. 3. For a discussion of corporate criminal liability for the asbestos catastrophe, see
Comment, Corporate Homicide: The Stark Realities of Artificial Beings and Legal Fictions, 8
PEPPERDINE L. Rtv. 367, 374-79 (1981).
11. Edgerton, Corporate CriminalResponsibility, 36 YALE L.J. 827, 840-44 (1927). Edger-
ton argued that regardless of whether a corporation is a distinct legal entity apart from its
shareholders, the corporation acts vicariously through its agents. Id.
12. 1 U.S. NAT'L COMM'N ON REFORM OF FED'L CRiM. LAWS, WORKING PAPERS 185
n.67 (1970); Mueller, Mens Rea and the Corporation, 19 U. PITt. L. REv. 21, 42, 48 (1957).
Mueller argued that criminal liability should be imposed on corporations only for the acts of
individuals who are primary representatives of the entity, having power over the group. Id.
13. See Developments in the Law-Corporate Crime: Regulating Corporate Behavior
Through Criminal Sanctions, 92 HARV. L. REV. 1227, 1243 (1979) (failure by entity to prevent
criminal conduct creates corporate blameworthiness) [hereinafter cited as Developments in the
Law].
14. See, e.g., People v. Duncan, 363 Ill. 495, 2 N.E.2d 705 (1936) (accessory cannot be
more severely punished than corporate principal when corporation cannot be indicted); People
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immunity from criminal liability, the Illinois legislature enacted section
5-5 of the Illinois Criminal Law and Procedure Code. Section 5-5 makes
a corporate agent liable for the corporation's conduct as though the agent
were acting as an individual, and also subjects the agent to a potentially
harsher penalty than the corporate principal.15 The revolutionary aspect
of People v. Film Recovery Systems, Inc., is that for the first time corpo-
rate officers, 17 high managerial personnel and the corporation itself were
v. Strong, 363 Ill. 602, 2 N.E.2d 942 (1936) (corporate officers cannot be prosecuted as either
principals or accessories when corporation not indictable for embezzlement).
15. Section 5-5 reads:
Accountability for Conduct of Corporation
(a) A person is legally accountable for conduct which is an element of an offense
and which, in the name or in behalf of a corporation, he performs or causes to be
performed, to the same extent as if the conduct were performed in his own name or
behalf.
(b) An individual who has been convicted of an offense by reason of his legal ac-
countability for the conduct of a corporation is subject to the punishment authorized
by law for an individual upon conviction of such offense, although only a lesser or
different punishment is authorized for the corporation.
ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 38, § 5-5 (Smith-Hurd 1972).
16. Nos. 83-11091, 84-5064 (Cook County Cir. Ct. of Ill. June 14, 1985).
One of the traditional attractions of incorporation is limited civil liability for shareholders
and absolute immunity from criminal liability. See supra note 8. Provided that a corporation
"jumps through the hoops" of the applicable corporate code, an investor does not risk more
than the purchase price of the corporation's stock. As in other areas of law, though, legislative
action and the movement of the common law have caused the pendulum to swing back to the
center, toward personal civil liability. Society has already dealt with the problem of limited
personal civil liability of shareholders using theories of fraud and inadequate capitalization. In
cases of fraud, the courts consider the real parties to be responsible. See Sell v. United States,
336 F.2d 467 (10th Cir. 1964) (corporate entity disregarded when recognition would bring
about fraud); see also 1 W. FLETCHER, CYCLOPEDIA OF CORPORATIONS § 44, at 517-19
(perm. ed. 1983). Cases involving fraud are most likely to involve contract creditors because of
the requirement of prior dealings inherent to fraud. Inadequately capitalized or "thin" corpo-
rate entities may be disregarded. Inadequate capitalization would weigh most heavily in a
situation where the corporation is likely to have insufficient assets available to meet its debts.
Id. § 44.1, at 528. A tort creditor is likely to prevail in an attempt to pierce the corporate veil
based on inadequate capitalization because a tort creditor has not chosen its debtor, but is a
victim. Perhaps it is time to pierce the corporate veil in a criminal context as well.
Individuals within a corporation are capable of being held criminally liable despite the
corporate structure. Corporate agents cannot escape criminal liability because they act in offi-
cial or representative capacities. See, e.g., People v. Cooper, 200 A.D. 413, 193 N.Y.S. 16
(1922) (agency not an adequate defense for defendant in charge of corporation charged with
creating public nuisance). However, individuals within a corporation are capable of escaping
criminal liability altogether. See infra note 193 for a discussion of why individuals within a
corporation often escape liability for their conduct.
17. There have been previous or similar indictments of corporate officers. See, e.g., People
v. Warner-Lambert Co., 51 N.Y.2d 295, 414 N.E.2d 660, 434 N.Y.S.2d 159 (1980), cert. de-
nied, 450 U.S. 1031 (1981), discussed infra notes 63-72 & 132-35, and accompanying text; see
also generally, Granite Constr. Co. v. Superior Court, 149 Cal. App. 3d 465, 197 Cal. Rptr. 3
(1983) (corporation can be indicted for manslaughter); Commonwealth v. Fortner LP Gas Co.,
610 S.W.2d 941 (Ky. Ct. App. 1980) (corporation may be indicted for manslaughter); State v.
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indicted and found guilty of the murder of an employee who died as a
result of unsafe working conditions.
18
This Comment explores the evolution of corporate criminal liability
and criminal accountability of individuals associated with corporate enti-
ties. It also proposes a standard to determine when individuals and cor-
porations that cause injuries should be held liable and proposes a range
of penalties tailored to the goal of deterrence.19
Because there is no uniform standard for holding corporations and
individuals liable for the criminal conduct of a corporation, this Com-
ment also will provide guidelines to aid the appellate court in Film Re-
covery when it decides the Illinois rule for accountability.
II. CORPORATIONS, CRIME AND HOMICIDE:
AN HISTORICAL OVERVIEW
A. The Nature of Corporations
There are two schools of thought as to how a corporation should be
defined. The first, and older, says that a corporation is essentially a col-
lection of individuals. An early English writer on the law of corpora-
tions, Kyd, stated, "[a] corporation . . . is a collection of many
individuals, united into one body,.., under an artificial form .... ",o
The second theory, espoused by Chief Justice Marshall, is that incorpora-
tion creates a distinct legal entity, and that "[a] corporation is an artifi-
Six Flags Corp., No. 65,084 (N.J. Super. Ct. 1984) (amusement corporation indicted for aggra-
vated manslaughter for the deaths of eight people killed in fire while trapped in one of park's
amusements); Vaughan & Sons, Inc. v. State, 649 S.W.2d 677 (Tex. Ct. App. 1983), review
granted, (June 15, 1983) (corporation may not be held criminally liable for negligent homi-
cide); Comment, Corporate Criminal Liability for Homicide: The Controversy Flames Anew, 17
CAL. W.L. REv. 465,483-84 (1981) (discussing indictment of Ford Motor Co. on three counts
of reckless homicide following death of three teenagers in Ford Pinto accident); Note, Corpo-
rate Homicide: A New Assault on Corporate Decision-making, 54 NOTRE DAME LAW. 911,
919-24 (1979) (also discussing Ford indictment); Comment, Corporate Criminal Liability for
Homicide: Can the Criminal Law Control Corporate Behavior? 38 Sw. L.J. 1275, 1285-86
(1985) (discussing indictment of amusement corporation for aggravated manslaughter for
deaths of eight people killed in fire while trapped in one of park's amusements).
18. Report of Proceedings at 5, Film Recovery Systems. See infra notes 141-53 and accom-
panying text.
19. This Comment also addresses the prosecution of a corporation for life-endangering
conduct. For a discussion of corporate criminal liability resulting specifically from defective
design, see Metzger, Corporate Criminal Liability for Defective Products: Policies, Problems,
and Prospects, 73 GEo. L.J. 1 (1984), where the author argued that corporate criminal liability
for defective products does not deter criminal conduct; Note, supra note 17, arguing that impo-
sition of corporate criminal liability for defective products will influence decision-making at
the highest levels of American industry.
20. 1 S. KYD, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF CORPORATIONS 13 (1793); accord Congdon v.
Congdon, 160 Minn. 343, 200 N.W. 76 (1924).
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cial being, invisible, intangible, and existing only in the contemplation of
law."21 It is easier to attach criminal liability to individuals under the
earlier definition since the latter definition implies that a corporation is,
itself, incapable of committing a crime.22
Because the modem theory of corporations shields corporations and
corporate personnel from liability for criminal conduct, the courts need
to set forth criteria to allow criminal piercing of the corporate veil. Such
criteria should be based on the idea that when a crime is committed, a
corporation is not a separate legal entity apart from its constituents.23 In
a criminal context, the court would view the corporation as a collection
of individuals engaging in the activities of the corporation, but the indi-
viduals themselves would be recognized as committing the corporation's
criminal acts.
B. The Common Law View of the Criminal Liability of Corporations
At common law, there were two reasons why a corporation could
not commit a crime.2 4 First, because a corporation had no mind, it could
not form the criminal intent required for all common law crimes. 25 Sec-
ond, because it had no body, a corporation could not physically commit a
criminal act or be imprisoned.26 Additionally, because the commission
of a crime was ultra vires27 activity to a corporation, a criminal act by a
corporate agent was considered beyond the authority of a corporation
21. Trustees of Dartmouth College v. Woodward, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 518, 636 (1819)
(state of New Hampshire could not alter college's corporate charter without corporation's
consent).
22. See, e.g., State v. First Nat'l Bank of Clark, 2 S.D. 568, 51 N.W. 587 (1892) (dictum);
criticized in Comment, "Corporate Entity"-Its Limitations As A Useful Legal Conception, 36
YALE L.J. 254 (1926) (arguing that formation of corporate entity is only one aspect of incorpo-
ration process).
23. See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Welansky, 316 Mass. 383, 55 N.E.2d 902 (1944) (affirming
conviction of owner of corporate nightclub for involuntary manslaughter following death of
patrons from fire and improper safety conditions in nightclub). See supra note 20 and accom-
panying text.
24. The rule, stated in New York Cent. & Hudson River R.R. v. United States, 212 U.S.
481 (1909), was that because a corporation was not capable of committing a crime it was
therefore not capable of being indicted. See also H. HENN, LAW OF CORPORATIONS § 184, at
354 (2d ed. 1970).
25. See W. LAFAVE & A. ScOrr, HANDBOOK ON CRIMINAL LAW § 33, at 228 (1972);
Brickey, Corporate Criminal Accountability: A Brief History and an Observation, 60 WASH.
U.L.Q. 393, 396 (1982).
26. A corporation, can however, be executed. Blackstone called the court-ordered dissolu-
tion of a corporation "civil death." I W. BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *484. See Note,
Corporations: Quo warranto: Forfeiture of Franchise on Account of Crime, 13 CORNELL L.Q.
92 (1927-28). See also infra notes 208-13 and accompanying text.
27. Ultra vires is defined as "[acts beyond the scope of the powers of a corporation, as
1416
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and therefore could not be imputed to it.28
As corporations gained importance in American business and soci-
ety,29 the common law barriers to corporate criminal liability eroded.
Corporations have been criminally prosecuted for nonfeasance, 30 regula-
tory offenses31 and for the crimes of their corporate agents. 32 Many state
statutes impose a fine on a corporation convicted of a crime for which the
defined by its charter of laws of state of incorporation." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1365
(5th ed. 1979).
More modem courts disfavor the defense of ultra vires when it is interposed by a corpora-
tion to avoid an obligation. However, earlier courts acknowledged the doctrine of ultra vires as
a valid defense. In Central Trans. Co. v. Pullman's Palace Car Co., 139 U.S. 24 (1891), the
Supreme Court decided whether a contract between a railroad and an out of state company
was ultra vires to the railroad's charter of incorporation. The Court rejected the railroad's
argument that " 'the doctrine of ultra vires, when invoked for or against a corporation, should
not be allowed to prevail when it would defeat the ends of justice or work a legal wrong.'" Id.
at 55. Reflecting the modem view, the 1905 Court embraced the same argument in Wyman v.
Wallace, 201 U.S. 230 (1906), where it held that a bank has the power to borrow money in
order to meet its obligations despite possession of assets in excess of its obligations.
The doctrine has been abolished or limited in a number of jurisdictions. See, eg., ILL.
ANN. STATS. ch. 32, T 3.15 (Smith-Hurd 1985) (ultra vires defense limited to suits between
shareholders and corporation, corporation and officers or directors, and state and corpora-
tion); CAL. CORP. CODE § 208(a) (West 1977) (ultra vires defense not allowed in suit between
corporation and third parties).
28. See Music Box, Inc. v. Mills, 10 La. App. 665, 121 So. 196 (1929) (illegal acts of
corporate officers could have no legal or binding effect on corporations themselves); Common-
wealth v. Punxsutawney St. Passenger Ry. Co., 24 Pa. 25, 26 (1899) (manslaughter "is so far
ultra vires as to contravene all accepted rules in the criminal law for making it the act of the
principal").
29. The development of complex business organizations, such as corporations, has paral-
leled the development of modem society. W. SCOTT, ORGANIZATIONS RATIONAL, NATURAL,
AND OPEN SYSTEMS 136 (1981). "Corporations have been incredibly productive, forming the
backbone of the most successful economic system in history." Metzger, supra note 19, at 1
(footnotes omitted).
30. In State v. Morris & Essex R.R., 23 N.J.L. 360, 369-70 (1852), the New Jersey court
traced the early history of corporate criminal liability and held that a corporation can be in-
dicted for misfeasance, as well as nonfeasance.
31. See, e.g., New York Cent. & Hudson River R.R. v. United States, 212 U.S. 481 (1909).
In upholding the conviction of a corporation for a violation of the Elkins Act, 49 U.S.C.
§§ app. 41-43 (1982) (repealed by Act of Oct. 17, 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-473, § 4(b)-(c), 92 Stat.
1466, 1470), the Court stated: "[W]e see no good reason why corporations may not be held
responsible for and charged with the knowledge and purposes of their agents, acting within the
authority conferred upon them." 212 U.S. at 494-95.
32. See supra note 31. "An agent who acts for or with his principal or other agents is
liable for resulting crimes as is any other participator in a criminal enterprise." RESTATE-
MENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 359A comment (1958). The intent of a corporate agent may be
imputed to the corporation. See, e.g., United States v. T.I.M.E.-D.C., Inc., 381 F. Supp. 730
(W.D. Va. 1974) (corporation held knowingly and willingly to have committed crime by im-
puting intent to collective knowledge of its employees). For an early discussion, see Edgerton,
supra note 11, where the author argued that corporations should be held criminally responsible
for their agents' acts to maximize the deterrent effect.
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punishment is incarceration.33 Despite increased corporate criminal lia-
bility, the United States Supreme Court has long maintained that "there
are some crimes, which in their nature cannot be committed by
corporations.
34
Traditional definitions of homicide have been a barrier to indicting
corporations for homicide because they usually refer to the persons com-
mitting the crime as human beings, not business entities. Typically,
homicide statutes define homicide as the unlawful killing of oneperson by
another person 35 or the unlawful killing of a human being caused by a
human being.36 While a "person" is often defined to include a corpora-
tion, 37 courts have often said that "another" means that the person killed
must be of the "same class" as the person doing the killing.38 Thus,
homicide traditionally has been a crime "[the] nature [of which] cannot
be committed by corporations.,
39
C. The Modern Cases
Since the 1900's, when the number of corporations began to in-
crease, courts have struggled to decide whether a corporation could be
criminally liable for homicide. One of the first recorded cases con-
33. See, e.g., ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 38, § 1005-5-3(c)(5)(B) (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1985), which
states in relevant part: "The court may sentence an offender convicted of a business offense or a
petty offense or a corporation or corporated association convicted of any offense to: ... (B) A
fine .... "
34. See, eg., New York Cent. & Hudson River R.R. v. United States, 212 U.S. 481, 494
(1909) (affirming conviction of corporation for illegal shipments in interstate commerce in
violation of the Elkins Act). The Court did not indicate the reasoning behind this statement,
nor did it list which crimes fell into the classification of crimes a corporation could commit,
and which crimes a corporation could not commit. See supra note 31.
Blackstone stated, "[a] corporation cannot commit treason, or felony, or other crime, in
its corporate capacity: though its members may, in their distinct individual capacities." 1 W.
BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *476-77. See infra note 82 and accompanying text.
35. See, e.g., N.Y. PENAL LAW §§ 125.10, 125.15 (McKinney 1975).
36. W. CLARK & W. MARSHALL, CRIMES 597 (7th ed. 1967).
37. See, e.g., 1 U.S.C. § 1 (1982); CAL. PENAL CODE § 7 (West 1970).
38. See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Illinois Cent. R.R. Co., 152 Ky. 320, 325, 153 S.W. 459,
461-62 (1913) (corporation may not be indicted for homicide because offense derives its crimi-
nality from evil intention), superseded by statutes: Ky. REv. STAT. §§ 446.010(26),
500.080(12), 502.050, 507.040, 534.050 (1985), Commonwealth v. Fortner LP Gas Co., 610
S.W.2d 941 (Ky. Ct. App. 1980); People v. Rochester Ry. & Light Co., 195 N.Y. 102, 107-08,
88 N.E. 22, 24 (1909) (acts and motives of corporate agents may be imputed to corporation,
and it is possible for legislature to enact laws by which corporations could be charged with
homicide); State v. Pacific Powder Co., 226 Or. 502, 505, 360 P.2d 530, 532 (1961) (corpora-
tion may not commit involuntary manslaughter as defined by statute). For the facts and hold-
ing of Rochester Ry., see infra notes 45-50 and accompanying text.
39. New York Cent. & Hudson River R.R. v. United States, 212 U.S. 481, 494 (1909). See
supra notes 31 & 34 and accompanying text.
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fronting this issue was the 1904 case of United States v. Van Schaik.40 In
Van Schaik, a corporation was indicted for manslaughter for failing to
provide suitable and sufficient life preservers on one of its steamships.
41
About 900 people drowned when the boat caught fire.4 2 Ruling on a
demurrer to the indictments, the Van Schaik court acknowledged that
the corporation could be guilty of manslaughter under a statute that pro-
vided that "every owner,... through whose fraud, connivance, miscon-
duct, or violation of law, the life of any person is destroyed, shall be
deemed guilty of manslaughter, and, upon conviction thereof... shall be
sentenced to confinement at hard labor. . .. "I The court held that
although the statute did not provide an appropriate penalty for a corpo-
ration, the omission was probably a congressional oversight and not an
attempt to immunize corporations from liability.' Thus, the absence of
an appropriate penalty was rejected as a bar to corporate criminal
liability.
Four years later, in People v. Rochester Railway & Light Co.,45 the
New York Court of Appeals acknowledged that a corporation could
commit homicide but dismissed the homicide indictment against the cor-
porate defendant. The defendant railroad corporation was indicted for
second degree manslaughter resulting from the installation of a "certain
apparatus in a residence... in such a... manner that gases escaped and
caused the death of an inmate."4 6 Analogizing to civil proceedings in
which a corporation is liable for the conduct of its agents acting within
the scope of corporate authority,47 the court noted that "'a corporation
acts by its officers and agents, [and] their purposes, motives and intent
are just as much those of the corporation as are things done.' "48 Never-
theless, the court dismissed the indictment, explaining that "[s]ection 179
of the Penal Code defne[d] homicide[ ] as 'the killing of one human be-
ing by the act, procurement or omission of another.' "'9 The court found
that "another" referred only to another human being, so a corporation
could not be guilty under the statute.50
One of the first state cases to sustain an indictment against a corpo-
40. 134 F. 592 (C.C.S.D.N.Y. 1904).
41. Id. at 594.
42. Id.
43. Id. (citation omitted).
44. Id. at 602.
45. 195 N.Y. 102, 88 N.E. 22 (1909).
46. Id. The type of "apparatus" installed was not stated by the court.
47. Id. at 105, 88 N.E. at 23.
48. Id. at 103-04, 88 N.E. at 23 (quoting J. BISHOP, NEW CRIMINAL LAW § 417 (1892)).
49. Id. at 107, 88 N.E. at 24 (citation omitted).
50. Id. See also Commonwealth v. Illinois Cent. R.R., 152 Ky. 320, 153 S.W. 459 (1913)
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ration for criminal homicide was the 1917 case of State v. Lehigh Valley
Railroad Co. 51 There, the corporate defendant moved to quash an indict-
ment for manslaughter.5 2 In denying the motion, the New Jersey
Supreme Court recognized the growing trend of attaching criminal liabil-
ity to corporations:
We need not consider whether the modification of the common
law by our decisions is to be justified by logical argument; it is
confessedly a departure at least from the broad language in
which the earlier definitions were stated, and a departure made
necessary by changed conditions if the criminal law was not to
be set at naught in many cases by contriving that the criminal
act should be in the law the act of a corporation. 3
The Lehigh court rejected the traditional definition of homicide re-
lied on in Rochester Railway and instead adopted the broader definitions
promulgated since that case. The court refused to be limited by an arbi-
trary concept of homicide as the killing of one human being only by an-
other human being. 4 The court criticized Rochester Railway stating:
The case [Rochester Railway] is a good illustration of the way
in which the proper growth and development of the law can be
prevented by the hard and fast language of a statute, and of the
advantage of our own legal system by which the way is open for
a court to do justice by the proper application of legal
principles."
In 1974, a New York trial court received another opportunity to
uphold a homicide indictment against a corporation in People v. Ebasco
Services, Inc.56 In Ebasco, the defendant corporations were indicted for
negligent homicide under a statute that stated: "'[a] person is guilty of
criminally negligent homicide when, with criminal negligence, he causes
the death of another person.'-s Ebasco Services was retained by Con-
(corporation is artificial person distinct from victim, who was human being, and therefore
corporation held incapable of committing common law manslaughter).
51. 90 N.J.L. 372, 103 A. 685 (1917).
52. Id.
53. Id. at 373, 103 A. at 685.
54. Id. at 374, 103 A. at 686. See, e.g., 4 W. BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *189. Suicide
met Blackstone's definition of homicide. Id. The court found no valid purpose in granting
corporations criminal immunity. "We think of no reason why [the corporation] should not be
held for the criminal consequences of its negligence or nonfeasance." Lehigh Valley, 90 N.J.L.
at 374, 103 A. at 686.
55. Lehigh Valley, 90 N.J.L. at 376, 103 A. at 686.
56. 77 Misc. 2d 784, 354 N.Y.S.2d 807 (1974).
57. Id. at 786, 354 N.Y.S.2d at 810 (quoting N.Y. PENAL LAW § 125.10 (McKinney
1965)). Section 125.10 of the Penal Law read as follows: "A person is guilty of criminally
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solidated Edison of New York to perform management, construction and
engineering functions in connection with a $200 million extension to an
electrical generating station on the East River. The project required the
construction of a cofferdam, a boxlike structure submerged in water so
that water could be pumped out in order for workers to descend to the
river bottom. Two workmen were killed when the cofferdam collapsed.58
The corporations moved to dismiss the indictments, arguing that
"[a] person" could not include a corporate defendant because the crimi-
nal code defined " ' "[pierson," when referring to the victim of a homicide,
[as] a human being who has been born and is alive.' "I' The court dis-
agreed and held that the definition of "person" referred only to the vic-
tim of homicide, not the perpetrator, and that it was intended only to
exclude abortional killings from the statute.6" The court further held
that, under the holding in Rochester Railway, the legislature could im-
pose criminal liability on a corporation for homicide.6' Nevertheless, the
court dismissed the indictments for lack of specificity.
62
Six years later, in People v. Warner-Lambert Co.,63 New York's
highest court recognized that corporations may be indicted for homicide,
but added a requirement that the triggering cause of death be either fore-
seen or foreseeable.' Because the court did not find that the cause of
death was foreseeable, it dismissed the indictment.65
Warner-Lambert is a manufacturing corporation that produces
Freshen-Up chewing gum, a square-shaped tablet with a jelly-like center.
Part of the manufacturing process entailed passing filled ropes of the gum
through a bed of magnesium stearate (MS), a dry, dust-like lubricant,
negligent homicide when, with criminal negligence, he causes the death of another person."
N.Y. PENAL LAW § 125.10 (McKinney 1965). New York Penal Law § 125.05[1] reads as
follows: "'Person' when referring to the victim of a homicide, means a human being who has
been born and is alive." Id.
58. 77 Misc. 2d at 785, 354 N.Y.S.2d at 809.
59. Id., 354 N.Y.S.2d at 810 (emphasis added by court) (quoting N.Y. PENAL LAW
§ 125.05 (McKinney 1965)).
60. Id. at 786-87, 354 N.Y.S.2d at 810-11.
61. Id. at 787, 354 N.Y.S.2d at 811 (citing Rochester Ry., 195 N.Y. at 108, 88 N.E. at 24).
62. Id. at 788, 354 N.Y.S.2d at 812. The court said the indictment contained "sparce
factual allegations" supplemented "merely by the statutory definition of criminally negligent
homicide." Id. "Sufficient particularity is especially necessary in this case in view of the mul-
tiplicity of defendants, the length of time over which these crimes were allegedly committed
and the highly technical nature of the evidence involved." Id.
63. 51 N.Y.2d 295, 414 N.E.2d 660, 434 N.Y.S.2d 159 (1980), cert. denied, 450 U.S. 1031
(1981).
64. Id. at 298, 414 N.E.2d at 661, 434 N.Y.S.2d at 160. For additional discussion of
Warner-Lambert, see infra notes 132-35 and accompanying text.
65. 51 N.Y.2d at 307, 414 N.E.2d at 666, 434 N.Y.S.2d at 165.
1421
LOYOLA OF LOS ANGELES LAW REVIEW [Vol. 19:1411
then into a die-cut punch (Uniplast) sprayed with liquid nitrogen (a cool-
ant), where the gum was formed into the square tablets. 6 This process
dispersed MS into the air, which accumulated both at the bases of the
Uniplast machines and on the plant's overhead pipes. MS is normally an
inert, organic compound that in bulk, powdered form, will only burn or
smolder. When suspended in the air, MS is potentially explosive.67
The accident occurred after Warner-Lambert employees cleaned the
MS off of the machines and the overhead pipes causing "rising dust and a
'heavy fog' or 'mist' all around."6 Apparently, a spark caused an explo-
sion around one of the Uniplast machines, which set off a second explo-
sion.69 Six workers died and more than fifty workers were injured. 0
Warner-Lambert and the individual defendants moved to dismiss
the indictments . 1 In affirming the trial court's decision to grant defend-
ants' motion, New York's highest court held that the defendants could
not be liable because they could not have foreseen the cause of the
explosion:
Although [the defendants] were aware that there was a
broad, undifferentiated risk of an explosion in consequence of
ambient magnesium stearate dust arising from the procedures
employed in [Warner-Lambert's] manufacturing operations,
the corporate and individual defendants may nonetheless not be
criminally liable, on the theory of either reckless or negligent
conduct, for the deaths of employees occasioned when such an
explosion occurred where the triggering cause thereof was
neither foreseen nor foreseeable.7 2
66. Id. at 298-99, 414 N.E.2d at 661-62, 434 N.Y.S.2d at 160-61.
67. Id. at 299-300, 414 N.E.2d at 662, 434 N.Y.S.2d at 161.
68. Id. at 301, 414 N.E.2d at 662, 434 N.Y.S.2d at 162. Prior to the explosions, the
Freshen-Up plant was operating 24 hours per day, six days a week and producing two million
packages of gum a day. Note, Corporate Criminal Liability for Employee-endangering Activi-
ties, 18 COLuM. J.L. & Soc. PROBS. 39, 42 (1985) (citing Brief for Respondent at 6, Warner-
Lambert). During this time, the employees were exposed to the potentially dangerous MS
while performing their duties in the plant. There was also proof that nine months earlier
Warner-Lambert's insurance carrier had advised the company that the ambient MS dust was
hazardous because an explosion was possible, and recommended that Warner-Lambert install
exhaust vents and modify its electrical equipment. Instead Warner-Lambert's management
opted to change the manufacturing process to eliminate the dust altogether. By the time the
explosion occurred, only one of the six Uniplast machines had been modified. Warner-Lam-
bert, 51 N.Y.2d at 301, 414 N.E.2d at 662-63, 434 N.Y.S.2d at 161-62.
69. Warner-Lambert, 51 N.Y.2d at 301, 414 N.E.2d at 662, 434 N.Y.S.2d at 161.
70. Id. at 300, 414 N.E.2d at 662, 434 N.Y.S.2d at 161.
71. Id. at 298, 414 N.E.2d at 661, 434 N.Y.S.2d at 160.
72. Id. The opinion has been criticized. See Note, Criminal Liability of Corporate Manag-
ersfor Deaths of their Employees: People v. Warner-Lambert Co., 46 ALB. L. REV. 655, 659
(1982) (Warner-Lambert "may practically preclude the application of the New York homicide
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Other jurisdictions differ. In California, corporations can be prose-
cuted for manslaughter.7 3 In a 1983 case, Granite Construction Co. v.
Superior Court,74 the court of appeal held that corporations are proper
defendants in any criminal case because section 7 of the Penal Code in-
cludes a corporation in its definition of a "person."' 71 In Granite, seven
construction workers were killed in an accident at a power plant. A
grand jury indicted the construction corporation for manslaughter. The
defendant corporation alleged that it was exempt from such prosecu-
tion.76 The court denied the petition, finding support in California's
broad definition of manslaughter.77 It explained that "[u]nlike other
states' definitions, [Penal Code section 192] does not limit itself to natu-
ral persons by defining the act of manslaughter as the killing 'of a human
being... by another.' "78 The Granite court also recognized that courts
may impute intent and either criminal negligence or recklessness to cor-
porations in order to establish criminal responsibility. 9
Although in recent years corporations have been indicted for homi-
cide, 80 attempts to include their corporate officers and high managerial
statutes to corporate agents."). See also Note, supra note 68, at 45 ('The construction of a
causation barrier in Warner-Lambert highlights a judicial and legislative reluctance to decide
whether homicide laws are broad enough to cover deaths resulting from employee-endangering
corporate activities."). See also infra note 184 and accompanying text.
73. See Granite Constr. Co. v. Superior Court, 149 Cal. App. 3d 465, 466, 197 Cal. Rptr.
3, 4 (1983). For a full discussion of Granite, see infra notes 74-79 and accompanying text.
74. 149 Cal. App. 3d 465, 197 Cal. Rptr. 3 (1983).
75. Id. at 467, 197 Cal. Rptr. at 4 (citing CAL. PENAL CODE § 7 (West 1970)).
76. Id. at 466-67, 197 Cal. Rptr. at 4-5.
77. California defines manslaughter by statute:
Manslaughter is the unlawful killing of a human being without malice. It is of three
kinds: (a) Voluntary-upon a sudden quarrel or heat of passion.
(b) Involuntary-in the commission of an unlawful act, not amounting to felony; or
in the commission of a lawful act which might produce death, in an unlawful man-
ner, or without due caution and circumspection. This subdivision shall not apply to
acts committed in the driving of a vehicle. (c) Vehicular-...
CAL. PENAL CODE § 192 (West 1970 & Supp. 1986). California defines words and phrases in
§ 7 of the Penal Code, which states in relevant part: "the word 'person' includes a corporation
as well as a natural person ...." CAL. PENAL CODE § 7 (West 1970).
78. 149 Cal. App. 3d at 468, 197 Cal. Rptr. at 5 (quoting CAL. PENAL CODE § 192 (West
1970 & Supp. 1986)). The court also rejected the defense's argument that there are legislative
or policy reasons for excluding corporations from prosecution for manslaughter. Id. at 469,
197 Cal. Rptr. at 6. Finally, the Granite court stated that CAL. PENAL CODE § 672 (West
1970 & Supp. 1986), providing that a fine of up to $5000 may be imposed for felonies in
addition to the prescribed imprisonment, would apply if the corporation were convicted. Id.
79. 149 Cal. App. 3d at 472, 197 Cal. Rptr. at 8. The court gave a brief history of corpo-
rate criminal liability for homicide and concluded that while in some other states a corporation
may not be liable for certain crimes, "California law does impute intent to corporations." Id.
80. See supra notes 40-79 and accompanying text.
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personnel in the indictment have failed."1 At common law, corporate
officers were held liable for acts performed in the name of a corpora-
tion,8 2 but more recently courts have not held corporate officers liable
when the officer acted as an accomplice8 3 or when the corporation com-
mitted a crime by omission." The novel aspect of People v. Film Recov-
ery Systems, Inc. 5 is that the corporate officers and high managerial
personnel were not only indicted, but were also found guilty.
81. See People v. Warner-Lambert Co., 51 N.Y.2d 295, 414 N.E.2d 660, 434 N.Y.S.2d 159
(1980), cert. denied, 450 U.S. 1031 (1981) supra notes 63-72 and accompanying text. It has
been suggested that but for the inclusion of four individual defendants, the New York Court of
Appeals might not have dismissed the indictment in Warner-Lambert. See Note, supra note
68, at 44 n.42, where the author argued that the law has failed to confront the problem of
employee-endangering corporate activities. The individual defendants in Warner-Lambert
were the company's vice president in charge of manufacturing, director of corporate safety and
security, plant manager and plant engineer. People v. Warner-Lambert Co., 69 A.D.2d 265,
267, 417 N.Y.S.2d 997, 999 (1979), rev'd, 51 N.Y.2d 295, 414 N.E.2d 660, 434 N.Y.S.2d 159
(1980), cert denied, 450 U.S. 1031 (1981).
82. "A corporation cannot commit treason, or felony, or other crime, in its corporate
capacity: though its members may in their distinct individual capacities." 1 W. BLACKSTONE,
COMMENTARIES *476-77 (citing Case 935, Anonymous, 88 Eng. Rep. 1518 (1701)). The rule
is attributable to dictum by Chief Justice Holt in an anonymous case. No facts accompany
that opinion, which is reported verbatim:
Case 935. Anonymous. Corporation is not indictable.
Note: per Holt, Chief Justice. A corporation is not indictable, but the particular
members of it are.
88 Eng. Rep. 1518 (1701).
83. See, e.g., People v. Strong, 363 Ill. 602, 2 N.E.2d 942 (1936); People v. Duncan, 363
Ill. 495, 2 N.E.2d 705 (1936). In 1961, Illinois enacted § 5-5 of the Criminal Law and Proce-
dure Code to legislatively overrule Duncan and Strong. ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 38, § 5-5 (Smith-
Hurd 1972) (Committee Comments-1961). For text of § 5-5, see supra note 15.
84. Standard Oil Co. of Texas v. United States, 307 F.2d 120, 127 (5th Cir. 1962) ("[T]he
corporation may be criminally bound by the acts of subordinate, even menial, employees.").
Corporations also have been held accountable for criminal acts of low-level employees. See,
e.g., Steere Truck Lines, Inc. v. United States, 330 F.2d 719 (5th Cir. 1963) (knowledge of
employees and agents of corporation, truck drivers, attributable to corporation); Riss & Co. v.
United States, 262 F.2d 245 (8th Cir. 1958) (trucking corporation criminally liable for terminal
log clerk's failing to discover or refraining to report excess driving time violations to superi-
ors); United States v. George F. Fish, Inc., 154 F.2d 798 (2d Cir.) (willful act of salesman
attributable to corporation so as to make it liable for criminal prosecution for violation of
maximum price regulations), cert. denied, 328 U.S. 869 (1946); United States v. E. Brooke
Matlack, Inc., 149 F. Supp. 814 (D. Md. 1957) (knowledge of notice of corporation's agent, a
truck driver, acting within the scope of authority is notice to corporation); The President Coo-
lidge. Dollar S.S. Co. v. United States, 101 F.2d 638 (9th Cir. 1939) (shipping corporation
may be criminally liable for crew member emptying garbage into navigable water).
85. Nos. 83-11091, 84-5064 (Cook County Cir. Ct. of Ill. June 14, 1985).
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III. PEOPLE V. FILM RECOVERY SYSTEMS, INC
A. Facts
86
In People v. Film Recovery Systems, Inc.,87 Film Recovery Systems,
Inc, (FRS), one of the corporate defendants, operated a plant outside of
Chicago in Elk Grove Village, Illinois. FRS reclaimed silver from used
photographic film through a standard process called cyanide-leaching.88
Steven J. O'Neil founded FRS in 1979.89 O'Neil and B.R. MacKay &
Sons Inc. of Salt Lake City were the sole shareholders, and O'Neil was
president of both FRS and a sister corporation, Metallic Marketing Sys-
tems, Inc. (MMS).90
In 1981, O'Neil hired defendant Charles Kirschbaum as plant man-
ager. Kirschbaum had spent the previous two years working for another
silver reclamation company that had used the same cyanide-leaching
process as FRS.91 By this time, FRS had acquired a total of 120 tanks
and vats,92 and was grossing between $13 and $20 million per year.
93
In proportion to its growing number of vats and tanks, FRS in-
creased its work force from six to forty employees.94 FRS mainly em-
ployed illegal aliens from Mexico or Poland who spoke little or no
English, earning about four dollars per hour. In order to communicate
with their employees, O'Neil and Kirschbaum relied on defendant Daniel
Rodriguez, an illegal alien who spoke English and Spanish and was em-
ployed as foreman and assistant plant manager at a wage of about six
86. Because of the unavailability of court documents, the following facts are primarily
derived from a Los Angeles Times newspaper article which was based on the trial transcript,
other court documents and interviews with the prosecutors and defense lawyers. Siegel, supra
note 3, at 8, col. 1.
87. Nos. 83-11091, 84-5064 (Cook County Cir. Ct. of Ill. June 14, 1985).
88. Siegel, supra note 3, at 8, col. 3. FRS employees dipped film chips into huge vats
containing a solution of sodium cyanide and water. Spiegel, supra note 2, at 48. The silver on
the film reacted with the solution, producing silver cyanide, which was then pumped into
smaller electroplating tanks. Inside those tanks, an electric current drew the silver onto metal
plates. The employees would then remove the plates from the tanks and scrape the silver off of
them. Finally, the company shipped the silver flakes to a refinery where they were made into
silver bullion. Siegel, supra, at 8, col. 2.
Toward the end of the 1970's, the price of silver rose from $3.40 per troy ounce to $50 per
ounce. By early 1980, FRS's plant had grown from eight tanks and vats to 80, a size that
O'Neil, then in his mid-twenties, could not manage on his own. Id. at 8, col. 2.
89. Id. at 8, col. 2.
90. Id. See also, Spiegel, supra note 2, at 48.
91. Siegel, supra note 3, at 8, col. 3.
92. Id. at 8, col. 4.
93. Spiegel, supra note 2, at 48.
94. Siegel, supra note 3, at 8, col. 3.
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dollars per hour.95
FRS used Cyanogran brand sodium cyanide to reclaim silver.
96
Every container of Cyanogran carried a warning label that read, in Eng-
lish: "Poison. Danger! May be fatal if inhaled, swallowed or absorbed
through skin. Contact with acid or weak alkalies liberates poisonous
gas.... Do not breathe dust or gas. Do not get in eyes, on skin, on
clothing." 97 FRS dissolved the Cyanogran in water, a weak alkali. 98
Although Kirschbaum's previous employer had installed hooded
vents over each vat to remove the potentially poisonous gas from its
plant, FRS did not install hooded vents, but instead used a ceiling ex-
haust system. In July, 1981, a visiting insurance inspector noted that the
ceiling exhaust system did not remove any contaminated air, but merely
moved that air around the plant.99 Additionally, the equipment used to
test the quality of air in the plant had an error factor of plus or minus
twenty-five per cent. 1°°
FRS employees wore improper respirators: face masks designed to
prevent employees from inhaling particulates.101 The risk of working
with the sodium-cyanide solution, however, was inhaling poisonous gas,
not small particles; the latter being the risk of a worker using a grinder or
sander. An additional danger was posed by cyanide-contaminated water
from open vats which splashed on the plant's floor. 1°2 During the insur-
ance inspector's 1981 visit, he noted that FRS had outgrown its present
facility. In 1982, FRS added space by leasing the building next door.
However, only front-office personnel moved to the new building, while
twenty more tanks and vats were added to the existing plant.103
In August, 1982, a representative of the first aid company that sup-
plied and serviced FRS' first aid kits visited the plant. While there, she
observed an overpowering odor that smelled like ammonia and that
burned her eyes, throat and nose." 4 She had difficulty breathing and
95. Id
96. Id. at 8, col. 4. Cyanogran is manufactured by E.I. du Pont de Nemours & Co., Inc.
Id.
97. Id.
98. Id.
99. Id.
100. Id. at 8, col. 5. This means that the actual air quality in the plant could be as much as
25% above to 25% below that registered on the testing equipment.
101. Id. at 9, col. 1.
102. Id. at 8, col. 5. FRS' carelessness in letting the potentially poisonous cyanide and
water solution spill on the floor increased the potential for employees to be exposed to the
poisonous substance.
103. Id.
104. Id. The representative's symptoms were consistent with those normally associated with
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became nauseated. She saw that the sodium-cyanide vats were overflow-
ing and the floor was covered with crystal-like chips. The first aid kits
were also covered with similar crystal chips. 105
In December, 1982, Stefan Golab, a Polish immigrant, began work-
ing at FRS for $4.50 an hour, pumping and stirring the sodium-cyanide
solution inside the vats. Shortly thereafter, he began to come home from
work with headaches and nausea. He also vomited. On February 4,
1983, after he became sick at work, Golab brought an interpreter to the
FRS plant to ask Kirschbaum to transfer him away from the sodium-
cyanide vats. Kirschbaum said that he would try to help, but the next
work day, Golab was again assigned to stir and pump at the vats. 106
Four work days later, on February 10, 1983, Golab was still work-
ing at the vats. His fellow workers noticed that Golab's face was pale
white and he had difficulty walking. When the workers noticed foam
forming at Golab's mouth, they carried him outdoors to the parking lot.
Paramedics were called to the scene. When they arrived Golab was not
breathing and had no pulse; his complexion was blue-gray. The
paramedics unsuccessfully attempted cardiopulmonary resuscitation.
Although the paramedics knew that cyanide was used in the plant, they
did not administer amyl nitrite, the antidote for cyanide inhalation, be-
cause Golab's coworkers did not confirm that he had been exposed to
cyanide. 107 Golab was never revived.
10 8
In People v. O'Neil,09 a Cook County grand jury indicted the fol-
lowing individuals for murder: Steven J. O'Neil," ° Michael T. Mac-
Kay,'11  Gerald R. Pett, 12  Charles Kirschbaum 1 3  and Daniel
cyanide exposure. Exposure to cyanide may cause lassitude, headaches, insomnia, vertigo,
palpitations, skin eruptions and eye and ear disturbances. Contact with the skin may cause
rashes and itching. 7 TRAUMATIC MEDICINE AND SURGERY FOR THE ATrORNEY 579-80 (P.
Canter ed. 1962).
105. Siegel, supra note 3, at 8, col. 5.
106. Id.
107. Id. at 8, col. 6. While the paramedics' conduct may have been negligent because they
did not administer the antidote for cyanide poisoning even though they knew cyanide was used
at FRS, negligence by a health care provider does not relieve an accused from a charge of
murder. See People v. Dixon, 78 Ill. App. 3d 73, 397 N.E.2d 45 (1979) (where person inflicts
wound calculated to destroy life, there is no defense that victim's death was contributed to by,
or immediately resulted from, unskilled or improper treatment for injury by attending physi-
cians and surgeons); People v. Dilworth, 274 Cal. App. 2d 27, 78 Cal. Rptr. 817 (1969) (sur-
geon's negligence, which caused death, does not absolve defendant of murder if accused's act
was proximate cause of operation), cert. denied, 397 U.S. 1001 (1970).
108. Siegel, supra note 3, at 8, col. 6.
109. People v. O'Neil, No. 84-5064 (Cook County Cir. Ct. of Ill. indictment filed Apr.
1984).
110. Indictment at 1, O'Neil.
111. Id. MacKay owned B.R. MacKay & Sons, Inc., which was a shareholder of the two
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Rodriguez. 114 The grand jury also indicted FRS, MMS, and B.R. Mac-
Kay & Sons, Inc. for involuntary manslaughter."' All defendants were
also indicted on fourteen counts of reckless conduct.'
16
B. The Trial
In Illinois, there are no degrees of murder: homicide is either mur-
der, 117 voluntary manslaughter,"' involuntary manslaughter 19 or reck-
less homicide. 2 °
The defendant corporations in People v. Film Recovery Systems,
Inc."'2 were charged with involuntary manslaughter.122 In order to ob-
tain a guilty verdict against the corporations, the prosecution had to
other corporate defendants and also operated a private silver refinery. Siegel, supra note 3, at
9, col. 2, at 8, col. 2. MacKay's extradition from Utah was blocked by then governor Scott M.
Matheson. Id. at 9, col. 2.
112. Indictment at 1, O'Neil. Pett, a vice president of FRS, was dismissed from the case
after the presentation of the prosecution's case. Siegel, supra note 3, at 9, col. 2.
113. Indictment at 1, O'Neil.
114. Id.
115. Indictment at 1, Film Recovery. FRS operated the plant and employed the victim,
MMS was a sister corporation of FRS, and B.R. MacKay & Sons was a shareholder in both
corporations. Spiegel, supra note 2, at 48.
116. Indictment at 1, O'Neil; Indictment at 1, Film Recovery.
117. Illinois defines murder as:
(a) A person who kills an individual without lawful justification commits murder if,
in performing the acts which cause the death:
(2) He knows that such acts create a strong probability of death or great bodily
harm to that individual or another ....
Ill. Ann. Stat. ch. 38, § 9-1 (Smith-Hurd 1979).
118. Illinois defines voluntary manslaughter as:
(a) A person who kills an individual without lawful justification commits voluntary
manslaughter if at the time of the killing he is acting under a sudden and intense
passion resulting from serious provocation by:
(1) The individual killed, or
(2) Another whom the offender endeavors to kill, but then negligently or acci-
dentally causes the death of the individual killed.
ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 38, § 9-2 (Smith-Hurd 1979 & Supp. 1985).
119. Illinois defines involuntary manslaughter as: "A person who intentionally kills an indi-
vidual without lawful justification commits involuntary manslaughter if his acts whether law-
ful or unlawful which cause the death are such as are likely to cause death or great bodily
harm to some individual, and he performs them reclessly...." ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 38, § 9-
3 (Smith-Hurd 1979).
120. Illinois defines reckless homicide as being conduct otherwise qualifying as involuntary
manslaughter, see supra note 15, except that "the cause of death consists of the driving of a
motor vehicle, in which case the person commits reckless homicide." ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 38,
§ 9-3 (Smith-Hurd 1979).
121. Nos. 83-11091, 84-5064 (Cook County Cir. Ct. of Ill. June 14, 1985).
122. Indictment at 1, Film Recovery. For the Illinois definition of involuntary manslaugh-
ter, see supra note 119.
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show that the corporations'23 acted without lawful justification, on the
theory that their employees' and agents' actions were imputed to the cor-
porations themselves. The prosecution also had to show that the corpo-
rations' acts caused Golab's death, the corporations' acts were likely to
cause death or great bodily harm to some individual and the corpora-
tions' acts were performed recklessly.
124
As to the individual murder defendants,2 5 the prosecution had to
prove that the individuals acted without lawful justification, with crimi-
nal intent 126 and that their acts created a strong probability of death or
great bodily harm to the victim or another individual.
The prosecution relied on section 5-4 of the Illinois Criminal Code
to overcome the traditional common law barriers that immunized a cor-
poration from prosecution for homicide. The statute allows a corpora-
tion to be indicted for crimes so long as there is a legislative purpose to
impose liability on a corporation. 127 The statute also imputes the con-
123. The actions of an employee or agent may be imputed to a corporation to hold the
corporation criminally liable; see supra note 84 and accompanying text.
124. Section 4-6 of the Illinois Criminal Law and Procedure Code defines reckless conduct
as follows:
A person is reckless or acts recklessly, when he consciously disregards a sub-
stantial and unjustifiable risk that circumstances exist or that a result will follow,
described by the statute defining the offense; and such disregard constitutes a gross
deviation from the standard of care which a reasonable person would exercise in the
situation ....
ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 38, § 4-6 (Smith-Hurd 1984). See People v. Guthrie, 123 Ill. App. 2d
407, 258 N.E.2d 802 (1970) (tying up and leaving victim in cornfield on deserted road late at
night, resulting in victim's death, in order to perpetrate insurance fraud, may be reckless con-
duct); People v. Cunningham, 123 Ill. App. 2d 190, 260 N.E.2d 10 (1970) (hitting victim
across back with pool cue may be reckless conduct).
125. See supra note 117 and accompanying text.
126. Murder and involuntary manslaughter are distinguished only by their requisite mental
state. In People v. Cowen, 68 Ill. App. 3d 437, 386 N.E.2d 435 (1979), the defendant was
found guilty of murder for killing a 17 year old who was attempting to break into the defend-
ant's car. Id. at 441, 386 N.E.2d at 438. Defendant appealed seeking to reduce the conviction
to a lesser crime than murder. In reaching its decision, the court stated: "[m]urder requires
the intent to kill or do great bodily harm or knowledge that the acts create a strong probability
of such result, while involuntary manslaughter requires only reckless conduct which causes
death." Id. (citations omitted). The court affirmed the murder conviction. Id.
In People v. Bembroy, 4 Ill. App. 3d 522, 281 N.E.2d 389 (1972), the court found the
elements of the offense of involuntary manslaughter
may be distinguished from those of the offense of murder only in terms of the mental
state required. While a conviction for murder requires an intent to kill or do great
bodily harm, or knowledge that his acts will create a strong probability of such a
result, a conviction for involuntary manslaughter requires only reckless conduct
which causes death.
Id. at 525, 281 N.E.2d at 392 (citation omitted).
127. ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 38, § 5-4 (Smith-Hurd 1985). Section 5-4 provides:
(a) A corporation may be prosecuted for the commission of an offense if, but only
if.
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duct of a corporation's agent to the corporation; 2  another statute de-
fines voluntary actions as both acts of commission and omission. 2 9
More importantly, the Illinois law provides that conduct of an indi-
vidual on behalf of a corporation subjects that person to criminal liability
as though the conduct was performed on the individual's own behalf.
Additionally, the individual may be incarcerated or punished more se-
verely than the corporation.1 30 The prosecution was thus able to rely on
Illinois statutes to prosecute the officers and employees of the defendant
corporations.
Following the prosecution's case, the defendants moved to dismiss,
claiming that as a matter of law no case had been made against them. 131
The defendants based their claim on the rule of causation enunciated in
People v. Warner-Lambert Co.,132 that knowledge of the triggering cause
of death be "neither foreseen nor foreseeable."'133 In Warner-Lambert, a
chewing gum manufacturer and several of its officers and employees were
indicted for second-degree manslaughter and criminally negligent homi-
cide. 134 The indictments were subsequently dismissed. 135 Similarly, the
defendants in Film Recovery claimed that the cause of Stefan Golab's
(1) The offense is... defined by another statute which clearly indicates a legis-
lative purpose to impose liability on a corporation; and an agent of the corpora-
tion performs the conduct which is an element of the offense while acting within
the scope of his office or employment and in behalf of the corporation, . . .; or
(2) The commission of the offense is authorized, requested, commanded, or
performed, by the board of directors or by a high managerial agent who is acting
within the scope of his employment in behalf of the corporation.
(c) For the purpose of this Section:
(1) "Agent" means any director, officer, servant, employee, or other person
who is authorized to act in behalf of the corporation.
(2) "High managerial agent" means any officer of the corporation, or any
other agent who had a position of comparable authority for the formulation of
corporate policy or the supervision of subordinate employees in a managerial
capacity.
Id.
128. Id. § 54(a); see supra note 127 for text.
129. The Illinois statute defined a voluntary act as follows: "a voluntary act.., includes an
omission to perform a duty which the law imposes on the offender and which he is physically
capable of performing." ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 38, § 4-1 (Smith-Hurd 1972).
130. See supra note 15.
131. Siegel, Trial Makes History, Stirs Controversy, L.A. Times, Sept. 16, 1985, pt. I, at 8,
col. 1. The defendants opted for a court trial before Judge Ronald J.P. Banks instead of a jury
trial. Id.
132. 51 N.Y.2d 295, 414 N.E.2d 660, 434 N.Y.S.2d 159 (1980), cert. denied, 450 U.S. 1031
(1981); see supra notes 63-72 and accompanying text.
133. Siegel, supra note 131, at 8, col. 1 (citing Warner-Lambert, 51 N.Y.2d at 298, 414
N.E.2d at 661, 434 N.Y.S.2d at 160).
134. Warner-Lambert, 51 N.Y.2d at 299, 414 N.E.2d at 661, 434 N.Y.S.2d at 160.
135. Id. at 307, 414 N.E.2d at 666, 434 N.Y.S.2d at 165.
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death was also not "foreseen nor foreseeable." After hearing arguments
on the defendants' motion to dismiss, Judge Banks deliberated for ten
minutes, then dismissed defendant Pett and ordered the trial to
continue. 
136
The remaining defendants then presented their case. Each individ-
ual defendant pointed his finger at his superiors until finally it appeared
that FRS was an entity operating without human control. Defendant
Rodriguez, the plant foreman, claimed that he had no knowledge that
breathing cyanide was dangerous, and that he was not a foreman, but
only gave orders because the plant manager, Kirschbaum, told him to.
Kirschbaum claimed that he did not change the method used to reclaim
silver; that everything was done as it was before he worked at FRS. He
also claimed that he did not know water was a weak alkali and to his
knowledge the purpose of testing the pH in the tanks was to protect the
tanks, not to prevent the creation of poisonous gas. Even FRS president
O'Neil denied any responsibility, claiming he was merely an employee of
the corporation.13 7 The defense attacked the credibility of the prosecu-
tion's witnesses,138 presented conflicting medical testimony,139 and either
tried to avoid responsibility for running the corporation or tried to shift
the responsibility to another individual. "
C. The Decision
In People v. Film Recovery Systems, Inc., 41 Judge Banks delivered a
guilty verdict from the bench.142 He made the following relevant find-
ings of fact: 1
43
136. Siegel, supra note 131, at 8, col. 1.
137. Id. at 8, col. 2. O'Neil said that B.R. MacKay & Sons had taken over the assets and
rights of the plant in payment for $800,000 of debt owed by MMS to B.R. MacKay & Sons.
Id. at 8, col. 4.
138. Id. at 8, col. 2. The defense pointed out that many of the prosecution's witnesses had
pending civil suits against the defendants and therefore would benefit from a conviction. The
defense also put on contradictory evidence regarding safety equipment in the plant. Id. Addi-
tionally, the defense argued that FRS' plant was similar to dozens of other silver recovery
plants and that workers regularly sent relatives to FRS for jobs. Id. at 8, col. 3.
139. Id. The defense medical experts and toxicologists suggested that Golab died of a heart
attack, not cyanide poisoning. Id.
140. Id. at 8, col. 3; see supra text accompanying note 137. At one point in the trial, the
prosecution asked an FRS bookkeeper, "Was anyone running the company on February 10,
1983?" The bookkeeper replied, "I don't know who was actually running the company, no."
The prosecution suggested, "The company was just running itself?.," to which the witness
replied, "Yes." Id. at 8, col. 5.
141. Nos. 83-11091, 84-5064 (Cook County Cir. Ct. of Ill. June 14, 1985).
142. Report of Proceedings at 11, Film Recovery.
143. Presumably, Judge Banks intended to protect his decision by preparing a substantial
record for appeal.
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1) Stefan Golab died of acute cyanide toxicity."4
2) The "conditions under which the workers in the plant per-
formed their duties [were] totally unsafe." '45
3) The "defendants were totally knowledgeable in the dangers
which are associated with the use of cyanide." '146
4) Steven J. O'Neil, was "in control and exercised control
over both Film Recovery Systems and Metallic Marketing Sys-
tems before and after the death of Stefan Golab, which was on
February 10, 1983." 147
5) Conditions at the plant which caused sickness and injury to
workers constituted reckless conduct. 148
6) Golab was murdered.1
49
7) Defendants created the conditions in the plant by omission
and commission. 50
8) Defendants were "either officers or high managerial per-
sonnel" of both FRS and MMS.
1 51
9) The statement, "a corporation cannot be convicted of a
crime because [the corporation] has no mind and it cannot
therefore have a mental state in order to infer knowledge on a
corporation" is totally erroneous.
1 52
Despite the defendants' arguments and evasions, Judge Banks found
all three remaining individual defendants guilty of both murder and four-
teen counts of reckless conduct, and found both FRS and MMS guilty of
144. Report of Proceedings at 5, Film Recovery. Judge Banks based this finding on the
testimony of workers, insurance inspectors, Occupational Safety and Health Administration
inspectors, Environmental Protection Agency inspectors and police officers about air condi-
tions in the plant. Judge Banks also relied on the Medical Examiner's testimony. According
to the toxicologist's report, Golab had a blood cyanide level of 3.45 micrograms per millili-
ter-a lethal amount. Id. at 6.
145. Id. at 6. Judge Banks found that the facility lacked sufficient safety equipment, that no
safety instructions were issued to workers, that the workers were not properly warned of the
hazards of working with cyanide, and that not all of the workers were capable of reading the
warning signs written in English and Spanish. Id. at 6-7.
146. Id. at 7-8. Judge Banks based this finding on the workers' testimony that the defend-
ants knew the workers were getting nauseated and were vomiting. O'Neil testified that he
knew the hazardous nature of cyanide. Kirschbaum saw the workers vomiting; he also wore
different safety equipment than the workers and had read the warning label on the sodium
cyanide containers. Rodriguez testified that he knew workers got sick at the plant, and that
he, too, had read the warning label. Id. at 8.
147. Id. at 8-9.
148. Id. at 9. See supra note 124 and accompanying text.
149. Report of Proceedings at 9, Film Recovery.
150. Id.
151. Id.
152. Id.
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involuntary manslaughter and fourteen counts of reckless conduct. 153
Specifically, Judge Banks stated that
the mind and mental state of a corporation is the mind and
mental state of the directors, officers and high managerial per-
sonnel because they act on behalf of the corporation for both
the benefit of the corporation and for themselves; and if the
corporation's officers, directors and high managerial personnel
act within the scope of their corporate responsibilities and em-
ployment for their benefit and for the benefit of the profits of
the corporation, the corporation must be held liable for what
occurred in the work place.154
Judge Banks' decision included only factual findings; no legal theory or
citation to precedent was included. On July 1, 1985, Judge Banks sen-
tenced each of the individual defendants to concurrent terms of twenty-
five years on the murder count and one year on each reckless conduct
count.155 He also fined FRS and MMS a combined total of $48,000.156
The Film Recovery defendants have filed a notice of appeal.
157
IV. ANALYSIS
People v. Film Recovery Systems, Inc. 151 is a breakthrough with re-
spect to increased corporate accountability. But, the trend toward in-
creased accountability should not go forward unquestioned; policy
considerations as well as a legal foundation for accountability must be
considered if the results are to be fair and efficient. Courts and legisla-
tures must also recognize that different types of criminal conduct may
require different civil or criminal penalties. Finally courts must decide
whether and to what degree criminal liability should attach to officers,
directors and high managerial personnel.
A. Public Policy Favors Increased Corporate and Individual
Criminal Accountability
1. Corporate criminal conduct injures society
Society is injured by all types of corporate criminal conduct: The
153. Id. at 10.
154. Id. at 9-10.
155. Spiegel, supra note 2, at 48-50. Each individual was also fined $10,000. Id.
156. Id. at 50. The Occupational Safety and Health Administration has yet to collect a fine
of $2,425 levied against FRS. Id.
157. Telephone interview with Thomas Tucker, Assistant Prosecutor in Film Recovery
(Feb. 4, 1986). No briefs have been filed as of this date. Id.
158. Nos. 83-11091, 84-5064 (Cook County Cir. Ct. of Ill. June 14, 1985).
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health and safety of the public continues to be compromised by the sup-
pression of information linking asbestos with disease;159 human life has
been lost, and will continue to be lost because Ford wanted its Pinto to
cost less money;1 60 the environment is damaged because corporations de-
cide to violate regulations regarding toxic waste;161 and the financial sys-
tem is weakened by securities fraud.1 62 These are but a few examples of
how individuals can be hurt by corporate conduct; the question is what
should be done?
2. Criminal liability deters corporate criminal conduct
There is little doubt that corporate criminal conduct is deterred by
criminal liability.1 63 Criminal convictions are not quickly forgotten and
personal criminal sanctions should cause corporate management to take
notice and institute preventative action."' The effect of criminal prosecu-
tions on third parties does not even require successful guilty verdicts; the
mere publicity of prosecutions accompanied by the certainty of jail terms
would cause corporate individuals to take notice. 165 If the president of a
corporation believes he will go to jail if his corporation is found guilty of
dumping toxic waste into the watershed, it is likely he will take action to
159. For a discussion of the asbestos tragedy see Comment, supra note 10. To find out how
a dozen businessmen answered the question, "Does business value human life?," see Does Busi-
ness Value Human Life?, 22 Bus. & Soc'v REv. 44 (1977).
160. For a discussion of "behind the scenes" corporate conduct in the Ford Pinto cases, see
infra notes 172-73 and accompanying text.
161. For a discussion of the effects of environmental crime, see Adler & Broiles, The Pollt-
tion Exclusion: Implementing the Social Policy of Preventing Pollution Through the Insurance
Policy, 19 Loy. L.A.L. REv. 1251, 1266-68 (1986) (oil spilled in a river and cloud of gas
escaped from a factory); McMurry & Ramsey, Environmental Crime: The Use of Criminal
Sanctions in Enforcing Environmental Laws, 19 Loy. L.A.L. REv. 1113, 1138-41 (1986) (haz-
ardous waste prompted criminal sanctions); Price & Danzig, Environmental Auditing: Devel-
oping a "Preventive Medicine" Approach to Compliance, 19 Loy. L.A.L. REV. 1189, 1191-95
(1986) (environmental auditing on the rise because of increased governmental regulation).
162. For a discussion of the E.F. Hutton fraud case, see infra note 193.
163. See MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.07 comment, at 148 (Tent. Draft No. 4, 1955) (deterring
illegal acts of corporate agents is ultimate justification for imposing fines on corporation); Edg-
erton, supra note 11, at 833 (arguing that because the primary purpose of criminal law is
deterrence, the proper question is not whether the individual corporation is guilty, but rather
whose conviction will further deterrence); Fisse, The Social Policy of Corporate Criminal Re-
sponsibility, 6 ADEL. L. REv. 361, 371 (1981) (stating that the threat of conviction makes
companies refrain from wrongful conduct). For a discussion of the deterrent effect of criminal
sanctions against corporations and corporate individuals, see infra notes 196-207.
164. See Levin, Crimes Against Employees: Substantive Criminal Sanctions Under the Occu-
pational Safety and Health Act, 14 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 717, 742-43 (1977).
165. Id. An example of the deterrent effect of individual criminal liability is the availability
of treatises and corporate criminal liability seminars which are now available. See, e.g., K.
BRICKEY, CORPORATE CRIMINAL LIABILITY (1984); Advertisement for Corporate Criminal
Liability Seminar, Nat'l L.J. Mar. 24, 1986, at 27.
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avoid such dumping.166
Increased corporate and individual criminal liability may also help
remove dangerous products from the marketplace. For example, high-
level corporate managers may be more inclined to remove asbestos insu-
lation from the market if their failure to do so could expose them to
criminal prosecution. Whether high-level corporate officials are moti-
vated by the threat of a jail sentence or by the threat of injury to the
corporation itself,167 society will benefit from their preventative action.
The threat of criminal liability should force corporate managers to insti-
tute more thorough safety precautions, such as posting warning signs in
the workers' native language. In People v. Film Recovery Systems,
Inc.,16 the individual defendants ignored warnings from an insurance
inspector, a first-aid kit representative and employees themselves.
169 If
defendants O'Neil, Kirschbaum or Rodriguez had realized they would go
to jail for their failure to act, it is likely they would have taken greater
safety precautions. 70
166. See, e.g., Dowie, How Ford Put Two Million Firetraps on Wheels, 23 Bus. & Soc'Y
R . 46, 55 (1977). "One wonders how long the Ford Motor Company would continue to
market lethal cars were Henry Ford II and Lee Iacocca serving twenty-year terms in Leaven-
worth for consumer homicide." Id.
167. For a discussion of court ordered dissolution of a corporation, or civil death, see supra
note 26 & infra notes 209-13 and accompanying text.
168. Nos. 83-11901, 84-5064 (Cook County Cir. Ct. of Ill. June 14, 1985).
169. See supra notes 99-100 & 104-06 and accompanying text.
170. However, there are limited instances when a corporate individual should not be crimi-
nally prosecuted. If, for example, there exists sufficient evidence to proceed against a low-level
employee, but not against complicitious supervisors or high-level personnel, it would be better
to proceed against the entity itself so that corporate officers and directors are put on notice of
the corporate misconduct. Coffee, "No Soul to Damn: No Body to Kick" An Unscandalized
Inquiry into the Problem of Corporate Punishment, 79 MICH. L. Rv. 386, 413 (1981); Elkins,
Corporations and the Criminal Law: An Uneasy Alliance, 65 Ky. L.J. 73, 82-83 (1976); see
generally Developments in the Law, supra note 13, at 1261-75. But see Comment, Is Corporate
Criminal Liability Really Necessary?, 29 Sw. L.J. 908, 926 (1975) ("In cases where the guilty
individual would only receive a fine, he might be deterred more by a corporate fine. The
prospect of losing his job could be more crucial to the corporate employee than having to pay
an individual fine.") [hereinafter cited as Comment, Is Corporate Criminal Liability Neces-
sary?].
An example of the corporate bar reacting to a judicial decision regarding the conduct of
corporate officers is Smith v. Van Gorkom, 488 A.2d 858 (1985). In Van Gorkom, a leveraged-
buyout plan was accepted by the corporation's board of directors. The court rejected the de-
fendant directors' and officers' defense that the board's action was an exercise of their business
judgment. Id. at 863-64. Van Gorkom might have been used subsequently by courts to narrow
the scope of the business judgment defense. Instead, the few times Van Gorkom has been cited
have been in order to distinguish the principal case, to state a broad proposition or as support
to a dissent. See Allison v. General Motors Corp., 604 F. Supp. 1106, 1117-18, 1120-22 (D.
Del. 1985) (derivative suit dismissed as premature because demand not properly made on
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3. Negative effects of corporate criminal liability
While public policy generally favors corporate criminal liability, 171
potential liability may have a negative effect on consumers. For example,
if a corporation is subject to criminal liability for marketing a dangerous
product, the corporation is likely to require more extensive testing on the
product before it is marketed, and the increased cost will be passed on to
the consumer.1 72  As a result, the availability of certain products may
board of directors); Lynch v. Patterson, 701 P.2d 1126, 1139 (Wyo. 1985) (derivative suit
alleging breach of fiduciary duty by directors).
There is little doubt that corporate constituents are aware of the Van Gorkom court's
ruling and the potential for personal liability for their actions. See Manning, Reflections and
Practical Tips on Life in the Boardroom After Van Gorkom, 41 Bus. LAW. 1, 6 (1985).
Given that the purpose of criminal sanctions is deterrence and the fact that personal lia-
bility causes individuals to make changes in their standard operating procedure, courts should
seek to hold individuals criminally liable. If the imposition of civil fines in Van Gorkom caused
an immediate publication of new corporate guidelines, see Manning, supra, then incarcerating
a corporate executive for twenty-five years will cause high-level individuals to demand safe
work places for their employees and to require notification of all deviations from proper safety
procedures. If the courts create a real threat of incarceration, then high-level corporate indi-
viduals will have no choice but to respond to dangerous job conditions in order to avoid crimi-
nal prosecution.
Another result of criminal sanctions and publicity may be to change the way workers
negotiate with management. Recently, U.S. Labor Secretary William Block indicated that
imposing criminal liability on corporate managers when a corporation endangers its employees
will cause corporations to ensure that health and safety are primary concerns in the business
system of this country. Broadcast over the ABC Television Network, Nightline, American
Labor: Givebacks & Fightbacks, Jan. 23, 1986, transcript at 7. If this is true, then unions will
no longer have to make concessions or bargain to have management provide a safe work place,
because to do otherwise may cause management to go to jail.
Another effect of imposing criminal liability on corporations is that victims would be
aided in their civil suits against the corporation. Tigar, Corporations' Liability for Criminal
Acts, Nat'l L.J., March 17, 1986, at 17, col. 1. "A criminal conviction is res judicata on the
liability issue, unless entered on a plea of nolo contendre." Id.
171. It has also been argued that corporate criminal liability is undesirable. See, e.g., Fran-
cis, Criminal Responsibility of the Corporation, 18 ILL. L. REV. 305 (1924) (arguing that state
prosecution to abate a nuisance is not proper foundation for expanding use of criminal law
against corporations); Note, supra note 72, at 675 (arguing that all corporate officers are stig-
matized by corporation's criminal conduct); Note, Corporate Homicide: A New Assault on
Corporate Decision-making, 54 NOTRE DAME LAW. 911, 922 (1979) (stating that the adverse
impact of criminal stigma falls most heavily on innocent parties and aruging that corporate
criminal sanctions should be reserved for exceptional cases because of the availability of civil
remedies); Comment, Is Corporate Criminal Liability Necessary?, supra note 170 (arguing that
corporate criminal liability punishes the shareholder and that jail sentences should be levied
against responsible individuals); but see Note, Corporate Criminal Liability, supra note 65, at
52-53 (arguing that innocent party's loss may be limited to capital investment and alternative
is to place impact of loss on innocent employees and consumers); Comment, Limits on Individ-
ualAccountability for Corporate Crimes, 67 MARQ. L. REV. 604, 637 (1984) (stating that cor-
porate criminal liability may be society's only method of deterring corporate crime because
individuals are capable of evading criminal liability).
172. An example of a product that had "probably the shortest production planning period
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decrease or the price of certain products may rise.17 3 It could also be
argued that individuals will not want to take positions of responsibility
with corporations if their liberty is risked by potential criminal sanctions.
Similarly, corporations may be reluctant to enter into more dangerous
ventures or risky technologies even if the results may be profitable and
progressive.
These concerns are beside the point. There can be no doubt that
criminal liability for corporations and corporate individuals provides
more benefits to society in the form of deterrence than it burdens society
in the form of higher prices and unavailable products. 74 Also, society
should provide employment disincentives for those prone to commit
criminal conduct. The law must facilitate the prosecution of both indi-
viduals and corporations when their conduct injures members of society.
B. The Law Must Expand to Guarantee Corporate Accountability
Public policy mandates increased corporate accountability through
criminal liability; now the law must catch up. Presently, there are few
standards for criminal liability. The New York Court of Appeals in Peo-
ple v. Warner-Lambert Co. 175 established a foreseeability standard. It re-
quired dismissal if the triggering cause of harm was "neither foreseen nor
foreseeable." 1
76
If Warner-Lambert is the prevailing rule of culpability, the People v.
Film Recovery Systems, Inc. 17 7 defendants should not escape criminal lia-
bility. In order to succeed under a Warner-Lambert theory, the Film
Recovery defendants on appeal will have to show that the "triggering
cause" of Stefan Golab's death, the inhalation of cyanide, was neither
in modem automotive history" is the Ford Pinto. Dowie, supra note 166, at 48. The normal
development time span, from conception to production, of a new car is about 43 months, but
the Pinto schedule was set at under 25 months. Because of the shortened schedule, design,
styling, product planning, quality assurance and tooling of machines were conducted concur-
rently. Id. "So when crash tests revealed a serious defect in the gas tank, it was too late. The
tooling was well under way." Id. Ultimately, the design flaw in the Pinto cost society by
taking human lives. Id.
173. Although it took seven years, Ford eventually was forced to provide a safe gas tank in
its Pinto. Dowie, supra note 166, at 46.
174. See, e.g., Comment, supra note 10, at 408-09 (corporate criminal liability should pro-
tect the common goals of health and safety).
175. 51 N.Y.2d 295, 414 N.E.2d 660, 434 N.Y.S.2d 159 (1980), cert. denied, 450 U.S. 1031
(1981).
176. Warner-Lambert, 51 N.Y.2d at 298, 414 N.E.2d at 661, 434 N.Y.S.2d at 160. For a
discussion of Warner-Lambert, see supra notes 63-72 and accompanying text.
177. Nos. 83-11091, 84-5064 (Cook County Cir. Ct. of Ill. June 14, 1985). For a discussion
of Film Recovery see supra notes 86-157 and accompanying text.
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"foreseen nor foreseeable."' 78 Although the Film Recovery defendants
might claim that the failure of the exhaust system to remove the cyanide
gas from the air was the triggering cause of Golab's poisoning, the evi-
dence that an insurance inspector told FRS that the air quality in the
plant was potentially hazardous evidences that FRS had notice of the
system's failure. 179 The defendants may also argue that Stefan Golab
triggered his own death by failing to follow safety procedures. This argu-
ment should fail because the lower court found that FRS did not give its
employees safety instructions.'1 0 Although FRS did post warning signs,
they were in English and Spanish only, which Polish workers like Stefan
Golab were unable to read.
Regardless of whether Film Recovery would be affirmed under a
Warner-Lambert rule, this standard of liability should not be followed.
First, Warner-Lambert is inconsistent with the prior rule of causation.
Before Warner-Lambert, the causation requirement for homicide was
that "the ultimate harm [be] something which should have been foreseen
as being reasonably related to the acts of the accused."'' In Warner-
178. Warner-Lambert, 51 N.Y.2d at 298, 414 N.E.2d at 661, 434 N.Y.S.2d at 160.
179. Siegel, supra note 3, at 8, col. 4. The Warner-Lambert rule has limited the scope of
homicide by forcing courts to examine intent subjectively. In People v. Beckles, 113 Misc. 2d
185, 448 N.Y.S.2d 398 (1982), the defendant struck the deceased with the back of his hand,
fracturing the victim's jaw. The deceased struck his head on an angular object causing contu-
sions and brain hemorrhages. The medical examiner determined that the cause of death was
hitting the angular object, not the defendant's slap. Id. at 185-86, 448 N.Y.S.2d at 399. In
dismissing the indictment, the court said
the defendant's intent to cause some injury is not a sufficient predicate of culpability
for criminally negligent homicide, in the absence of evidence that the circumstances
would have made it obvious to a person of ordinary sensibilities that the blow or
injury would create a substantial risk of death.
Id. at 187, 448 N.Y.S.2d at 399. The court, citing Warner-Lambert, found that proof of facts
which showed that the risk that ultimately resulted from defendant's conduct was not suffi-
cient to show intent at the time of defendant's conduct. Id. at 187, 448 N.Y.S.2d at 399-400
(citing Warner-Lambert, 51 N.Y.2d at 304, 414 N.E.2d at 664-65, 434 N.Y.S.2d at 163-64).
180. Report of Proceedings at 6-7, Film Recovery; see supra notes 97-101 and accompanying
text.
181. People v. Kibbe, 35 N.Y.2d 407, 412, 321 N.E.2d 773, 776, 362 N.Y.S.2d 848, 851-52
(1974), afld sub nom. Henderson v. Kibbe, 431 U.S. 145 (1977). In People v. Kibbe, the
defendants found a helplessly intoxicated man in a bar and agreed to drive him to a nearby
town, but instead robbed him and abandoned him without shoes, coat or glasses on an unlit
rural road in subfreezing weather. Id. at 410-12, 321 N.E.2d at 774-76, 362 N.Y.S.2d at 849-
52. Twenty or thirty minutes later, an illegally speeding truck struck and killed the man. The
truck driver neither braked nor swerved after seeing the man with his hands in the air. Hen-
derson v. Kibbe, 431 U.S. 145, 147 (1977). Despite the fact that the actual cause of death was
impact by the truck and not freezing, the New York Court of Appeals held the defendants
criminally liable for murder under a standard requiring that "the ultimate harm [be] some-
thing which should have been foreseen as being reasonably related to the acts of the accused."
Kibbe, 35 N.Y.2d at 412, 321 N.E.2d at 776, 362 N.Y.S.2d at 851-52.
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Lambert, the New York Court of Appeals conceded that the defendants
were aware of a "broad, undifferentiated risk of explosion" from the am-
bient MS dust. '82 Such a "broad, undifferentiated .risk of explosion"
would apparently place the Warner-Lambert explosion within the zone
of harm "which should have been foreseen." 18 3  Yet, the New York
Court of Appeals chose to ignore precedent and created a new standard
of culpability.
Second, the Warner-Lambert rule represents "a major setback for
the trend toward increased personal accountability in the corporate sec-
tor." '184 The Warner-Lambert standard is hard to meet. It will only al-
low liability if every link in the chain of causation was or should have
been foreseen by the defendant. In the corporate context, prosecutors
will have difficulty proving foreseeability by an individual defendant for
each component of a complicated business activity. Because the Warner-
Lambert standard is narrow, the risk of liability will be low; in all but the
rarest instance, corporations and individuals will be cloaked in a shield of
immunity.
The Warner-Lambert rule does not deter corporations and individu-
als from criminal conduct. When economic gains are weighed against
the risks of apprehension, prosecution and conviction, the profit maxi-
mizing corporations would choose to ignore rules and regulations regard-
ing health, safety and other criminal laws. If Warner-Lambert results in
a corporation perceiving little chance of conviction, it is likely to dump
its waste as cheaply as possible, usually through illegal means. 85 In fact,
182. Warner-Lambert, 51 N.Y.2d at 304, 414 N.E.2d at 664, 434 N.Y.S.2d at 163.
183. Kibbe, 35 N.Y.2d at 412-13, 321 N.E.2d at 776, 362 N.Y.S.2d at 851-52. Note, supra
note 68, at 44. But cf. Note, supra note 72, at 672 (arguing that "Kibbe ... left unclear
whether 'ultimate harm' meant simply the occurrence of death or the particular way that
death occurred. The Warner-Lambert court held that 'ultimate harm' means the particular
way that death occurs.").
184. Note, supra note 72, at 659. For a discussion of policy rationales favoring criminal
liability for corporations and corporate individuals, see supra notes 159-71 and accompanying
text. See generally Note, supra note 68.
185. Another shortcoming of focusing criminal liability on individuals within a corporation
is that individuals will weigh the advantage of committing a crime against the disadvantage of
being caught. Inherent in the individual's analysis will be the likelihood of advancement and
recognition by the corporation following the commission of a crime as compared to the likeli-
hood of prosecution for the same act. Ultimately, in order to achieve a deterrent effect, strong
penalties for conviction will have to be coupled with rigorous enforcement. Coffee, supra note
170, at 410. Professor Coffee assumed that the corporation may penalize an individual who
does not perform adequately, possibly with dismissal. Id.
As an example, Professor Coffee stated: "suppose the manager views conviction as three
times as severe a penalty as dismissal, but there is no more than a 25% chance of conviction.
Conversely, there may be a 75% likelihood that he will lose his position" if the crime is not
committed. Id. It is entirely possible that the individual will prefer to violate the law to avoid
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in Film Recovery, FRS had been storing its waste in rented warehouses
rather than spending the money for proper disposal. Corporate manage-
ment responsible for disposing of the corporation's waste may even be
rewarded by superiors who do not realize why the waste disposal cost has
decreased or has not increased.
Regardless of whether Warner-Lambert is explicitly adopted or not,
the appellate court will have to adopt some standard of liability for alleg-
edly corporate criminal acts. The broader task for the court is to shape a
standard that effectively and fairly imposes criminal liability on corpora-
tions and corporate individuals. An appellate court following Warner-
Lambert's extremely restrictive standard of liability would necessarily ig-
nore the policy arguments in favor of applying individual liability to the
Film Recovery defendants-namely deterrence.
1 86
Any reversal-under the Warner-Lambert theory or otherwise-
would be an unwelcome retreat.1 87 Finally, a reversal of the conviction
of corporate officers and high managerial personnel would contradict the
emerging trend towards holding corporations responsible for their acts;
society is demanding that this type of activity be addressed in the crimi-
nal courts.18 8 A better rule for criminal liability is mandated.
the more certain penalty of termination, and risk a more severe, but less likely penalty of
imprisonment.
See also, eg., Granite Constr. Co. v. Superior Court, 149 Cal. App. 3d 465, 469, 197 Cal.
Rptr. 1, 6 (1983) (fine of up to $5,000 may be imposed on convicted corporation (citing CAL.
PENAL CODE § 672 (West 1982))). See supra notes 73-79.
In the area of environmental protection, however, the federal government has taken an
active role in imposing criminal liability on individuals because federal statutes, as a general
rule, impose criminal liability without requiring bad intent. Wheeler, Potential for Criminal
Liability of Personnel Under FederalActs, Nat'l L.J., Mar. 24, 1986, at 22, col. 1. For example,
in 1984, 20 individuals were prosecuted for criminally violating environmental laws. Id. The
penalties ranged from jail terms, to community service, to probation, to monetary fines and
combinations of all four penalties. Id. at 24, col. 2.
186. See supra notes 164-70.
187. For a discussion of the policy behind criminal liability for corporations, see supra notes
159-71.
188. For example, Texas sought retribution from a corporation and its high level employ-
ees. State v. Autumn Hills Convalescent Nursing Home, No. 85-CR-2526 (Bexar Cty. Ct. of
Tex. Apr. 2, 1986) (dismissed because of hung jury). Autumn Hills Convalescent Centers, Inc.
and five former and current employees were charged with murder in the death of a patient.
The prosecution claimed that the patient died because the nursing home tried to save money
by giving the patient improper care, while the defense maintained that the woman died of
cancer. L.A. Daily J., Oct. 1, 1985, at 5, col. 3.
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V. PROPOSAL
A. A Proposal for Criminal Culpability
Society needs a rule of culpability that will apply not only in an
egregious case like People v. Film Recovery Systems, Inc.,189 but also in
other situations where corporate criminal conduct needs to be deterred.
Any plan for imposing individual criminal liability must allow the corpo-
rate individual to respond to notice of potential criminal conduct by
seeking to prevent the conduct. An individual should be able to exoner-
ate himself from criminal liability if he can show that he attempted to
prevent or stop the conduct.
The following proposal suggests a standard for corporate and indi-
vidual liability. Its premise is that criminal liability should be deterred
and that the corporate fiction should not work to shield responsible indi-
viduals. 190 Individuals with knowledge of criminal conduct should be
culpable if they are in a position to deter the conduct but fail to act. The
prosecutor would have to prove the following:
(1) actual knowledge of potential criminal conduct;191
(2) notice that such criminal conduct is occurring; and
(3) sufficient control or power by the individual over the cor-
poration to stop or prevent the criminal conduct.
The existence of these elements would create an affirmative duty on the
individual to take action, and failure to act would establish culpability
against the individual. 192 However, even if the individual could not be
held criminally liable, the corporation would be subject to criminal liabil-
ity and criminal penalties.
93
189. Nos. 83-11901, 84-5064 (Cook County Cir. Ct. of Ill. June 14, 1985).
190. Paul Brodeur, author of three books on the subject of asbestos-related disease and
litigation between victims and manufacturing corporations, has stated that the best way to
prevent an environmental catastrophe, like the current asbestos problem in schools, homes and
office buildings, is to hold corporations and their executives criminally accountable for the
hazardous materials they produce. Controversy: For Victims of the Hidden Killer Asbestos, a
Manufacturer's Settlement May Prove to be Too Little, Too Soon, PEOPLE WEEKLY, Mar. 10,
1986, at 124 (interviewer J. Jerome). Brodeur also stated that the criminal law is "the greatest
preventive weapon in making the workplace--and the air and water we use-safe for all of
us." Id.
191. Criminal conduct will take various forms. In Film Recovery, the criminal conduct was
the omission to provide a safe work place for FRS' employees. However, in a fraud case, see
infra note 193, the criminal conduct may be illegal transactions or misrepresentations. The
injury to society will also take different forms. Society may be physically injured, as in Film
Recovery, or monetarily injured.
192. See supra note 190.
193. The corporation may be found guilty for the conduct of its agents even though the
agents are acquitted. This was illustrated in United States v. General Motors Corp., 121 F.2d
376 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 314 U.S. 618 (1941). There, four corporations were convicted of
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This standard of corporate criminal liability would provide useful
guidelines for prosecutors, judges and most importantly, corporate of-
conspiracy to restrain trade, but all of the individual defendants were acquitted. On appeal,
the Seventh Circuit stated that it was logically impossible to reconcile the acquittals of the
individuals with the convictions of the corporations. The corporations were found guilty of a
crime requiring intent, despite the fact that a corporation acts only through its agents, and
every officer or agent who could have acted on behalf of the corporations was acquitted. Nev-
ertheless, the court reasoned that the issue on appeal was not whether a logically consistent
verdict was handed down, but whether the conviction of the corporate defendants was consis-
tent with the evidence adduced at trial, and affirmed. Id. at 411. See also Kadish, Some Obser-
vations on the Use of Criminal Sanctions in Enforcing Economic Regulations, 30 U. CHI. L.
REv. 423, 430-35 (1963).
For a number of reasons, prosecutors are often reluctant to bring criminal charges against
individuals within a corporation. First, it is difficult to pinpoint which upper-level official is
responsible. The corporation may not be helpful in fingering one of its own officials, resulting
in defacto immunity for responsible corporate individuals. Fisse, supra note 159, at 371-72.
The collective nature of the corporation will make an offense attributable to various levels of
the corporate hierarchy. Id. at 372-73; Elkins, supra note 170, at 83.
Second, it is often difficult to prove that upper-level executives possess knowledge of cor-
porate offenses; this may be the result of complex organizational structures, lower-level em-
ployee shielding, hiding of information, or simply lack of time. See M. CLINARD & P.
YEAGER, CORPORATE CRIME 279 (1980); Metzger, supra note 19, at 55-58. For example, in a
recent criminal case against E.F. Hutton, the assistant United States attorney did not seek
indictments against the E.F. Hutton employees involved, and instead, allowed the corporation
to plead guilty to 2000 criminal counts of fraud and pay $2 million in fines and $750,000 in
costs. United States v. E.F. Hutton & Co., No. CR 85-000-83 (M.D. Pa. May 2, 1985). The
prosecutor defended his decision before a hearing conducted by the House Judiciary subcom-
mittee on Crime, stating that to do otherwise would require the prosecution of practically all of
Hutton's employees because, in perpetrating the fraud, they followed an industry standard.
Houston, Prosecutor in Hutton Case Defends Actions, L.A. Times, Dec. 7, 1985, pt. IV, at I,
col. 5. Similarly, the FRS defendants attempted to justify their actions by claiming that they
too followed an industry standard in setting up their silver reclamation system. Siegel, supra
note 3, at 8, col. 3.
Large corporations are usually more successful than small ones at insulating themselves
and individuals from criminal liability. This immunity stems from three factors: (1) society's
notion that large corporations provide a good service to society and are therefore not morally
blameworthy; (2) the fact that large corporations themselves do not pay for their crimes, but
the penalty is borne either by blameless shareholders in the form of decreased dividends and/
or by equally blameless consumers in the form of higher prices; and (3) the ability of corporate
officers and high managerial personnel to distance themselves from the adverse effects of crimi-
nal conduct. See H. PACKER, THE LIMITS OF THE CRIMINAL SANCTION 359 (1968); J. HALL,
GENERAL PRINCIPLES OF CRIMINAL LAW 202-03 (1947) (arguing that "in penal law.., the
immorality of the actor's conduct is essential-whereas pecuniary damage is entirely irrele-
vant"). See generally Mueller, supra note 12, at 38-41. See Coffee, supra note 170, at 401
("when the corporation catches a cold, someone else sneezes"). See also, Orland, Reflections
on Corporate Crime: Law in Search of Theory and Scholarship, 17 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 501,
514-15 (1980). "[I]n an overwhelming majority of cases, the subsequent corporate careers of
[convicted, though not incarcerated] executives were not hindered by their felony convictions.
This suggests that certain corporate crime 'pays' even if one is convicted." Id. at 514. Profes-
sor Orland suggested that corporate shareholders reward the convicted official because the
crime was committed in order to benefit the corporation. Id. at 515.
If prosecutors were armed with a framework for fixing criminal liability on corporate
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ficers and management. It would also be flexible enough to apply to the
spectrum of corporate criminal conduct.
B. A Proposed Sliding Scale of Penalties
Penalties for corporate criminal conduct should be geared towards
deterring the specific acts of culpable parties. Possible penalties for indi-
viduals include monetary fines, community service and jail sentences.
Possible penalties for corporate entities include community service or
probation, monetary fines in the form of cash or equity securities,1 94 and
civil death.195 More severe penalties should be handed down for crimes
consisting of more egregious conduct. 96 The court should consider such
factors as deliberateness of the conduct; motivation for the conduct;
blameworthiness of the individual responsible for the conduct; and bene-
fits received by the actor committing the conduct. This section analyzes
the effectiveness of various penalties as applied to the People v. Film Re-
covery Systems, Inc. "9 facts, and other suspect corporate activity.
1. Fines
Fines should be reserved for the least culpable defendants as deter-
mined by the fact finder. But by no means should this penalty be taken
lightly: the single most important value to a corporation is money-the
bottom line. In a marketable corporation, the value of its shares of stock
increase if the corporation shows a profit; moreover, credit ratings for
individuals, because prosecutions would more likely be successful, perhaps they would be less
reluctant to indict individuals because the prosecutions would more likely be successful.
An alternative to relying on prosecutorial discretion is the use of private attorney general
statutes. Coffee, supra note 170, at 434-40. Coffee urged a plan in which an attorney's finan-
cial compensation is dependent upon whether the government investigated the violation. If so,
the attorney would receive less than if he unearthed the violation. However, the use of private
attorney general statutes presents a host of problems. First, monetary penalties could be cir-
cumvented by savvy corporate executives who would insist upon indemnity contracts before
accepting employment with a corporation. This would nullify the effect of any penalty and
would provide the corporation with an incentive to shield its employees. Second, while corpo-
rate crimes may be detectable by private attorneys, there is nothing to suggest that a private
attorney will be more capable than a prosecutor in penetrating the web of corporate protection
that often insulates a corporate individual from criminal prosecution by the state. In short,
while private attorney general statutes and policies favoring their use should be encouraged in
order to aid in the punishment of corporate offenders, these laws may prove as ineffective as
prosecutorial discretion. Cf Coffee, supra note 170, at 436-37.
194. Professor Coffee suggests that the equity securities used should be a special class of
common stock issued by the guilty corporation. Coffee, supra note 170, at 413.
195. For a discussion of civil death, or court ordered dissolution, see infra text accompany-
ing notes 209-13.
196. See supra note 159.
197. Nos. 83-11901, 84-5064 (Cook County Cir. Ct. of Ill. June 14, 1985).
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corporate borrowing improve, and officers and directors get salary raises
and retain their positions if the corporation shows a profit.
Fines should be levied in order to deter criminal conduct provided
the adverse effect of economic sanctions does not fall on innocent em-
ployees, shareholders or consumers.1
9 8
Criminal fines are often toothless because corporations include fines
and sanctions in the cost of doing business and pass them on to the con-
sumer. 199 Consider the cost of fines to any corporation: when the fine is
small enough to be passed on to the consumer without affecting market
position, it is passed on; but when the sanction crosses this threshold, the
dangerous activity must cease. 2" Corporations are deterred from violat-
ing the law so long as the sanction cannot be passed on to the consumer
or the risk of enforcement is high.
The primary argument against imposing criminal liability on corpo-
rations is that monetary sanctions will ultimately fall on innocent share-
holders in the form of reduced dividends, or on consumers in the form of
higher prices.2"' To prevent such occurrences, Professor Coffee offered a
monetary sanction solution that cannot be passed on to shareholders or
consumers. Coffee suggested that severe penalties should be imposed on
198. See infra notes 201-06 and accompanying text.
199. Russell Mokhiber, a staff attorney with the Corporate Accountability Group, illus-
trated the relative weight of criminal sanctions against corporations as compared to
individuals:
On August 21, 1985, the Eli Lilly drug company pleaded guilty to misdemeanor
counts of failing to notify the U.S. government of numerous deaths and injuries
among overseas users of Oraflex, an arthritis drug. Without knowledge of these over-
seas deaths, the U.S. Food and Drug Administration had approved Oraflex for use in
the United States.... Lilly was fined $25,000; William H. Shedden, a former Lilly
executive who pleaded no contest to the charges, was fined $15,000.
-.. While Eli Lilly was fined $25,000 after being convicted in the Oraflex case,
Wallace Richard Stewart of Kentucky was sentenced in July 1983 to 10 years in
prison for stealing a pizza.
Mokhiber, supra note 10, at 4, col. 4.
200. The following example demonstrates how fines can be included in the cost of doing
business. A small corporation was engaged in the textile business. Unfortunately for the sole
shareholder, his textile plant was located directly across the street from an office of the Envi-
ronmental Protection Agency (EPA). Every time the company performed a necessary proce-
dure requiring the application of heat to black fabric, black smoke was emitted from the plant
in violation of air quality standards and an EPA representative would issue a fifty dollar cita-
tion to the corporation. Following repeated fifty dollar citations, which the corporation could
easily include in its cost of doing business, EPA threatened a larger monetary penalty, criminal
prosecution, or both. The small corporation immediately stopped processing the black
fabric-at least during daylight hours. Interview with Alan Brandt, Executive with Burling-
ton Industries, in Los Angeles (Mar. 2, 1986).
201. For a discussion of the shortcomings of corporate criminal liability, see supra note 171.
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corporations in the form of equity securities.2" 2 "The convicted corpora-
tion should be required to authorize and issue such number of shares to
the state's crime victim compensation fund as would have an expected
market value equal to the cash fine necessary to deter illegal activity.
20 3
Professor Coffe also suggested that a convicted corporation which is pe-
nalized by the loss of a large block of shares will likely gain superior
managers because the pressure to realize short-term gains will be ne-
gated.2 4 By making a corporation surrender equity securities, society
benefits from the deterrent value of a fine without the usual disadvantage
of paying the fine's hidden cost.
Equity securities should not be used where less egregious conduct is
involved. It is quite possible that little or none of the money derived in
the form of securities would reach the victim's compensation trust fund
because of administrative expenses. But if equity securities were used on
a regular basis, much of the administrative structure and cost of supervis-
ing a trust fund would already be established; this suggests that equity
securities should be used even in the smallest of monetary fines against a
corporate entity. The deterrent effect on other corporations should be
great due to the attendant publicity of the sanction. Thus, equity securi-
ties would ease the burden on innocent employees, shareholders and
consumers.
In cases like Film Recovery, a fine of any sort is improper. As
Ford's Pinto demonstrated, corporations may be tempted to sacrifice
205sacinhuman life in exchange for monetary gains. Monetary sanctions
should be reserved for the least egregious conduct so as to maximize
deterrence.
Fines against an individual are also inadvisable because they are not
likely to deter criminal conduct. An individual may pass the cost on to
his employer,20 6 who in turn shifts the cost to other innocent sharehold-
202. Coffee, supra note 170, at 413.
203. Id. Professor Coffee used the phrase "cash fine necessary to deter" to imply that a
substantial sum would be necessary. Also, it should be noted that Professor Coffee's plan to
impose an equity penalty would be inefficient if used against a small close corporation because
no trading market exists for such shares of stock.
204. Id. at 418.
205. For a discussion of the Ford Pinto tragedy, see infra note 208 & supra notes 172-73.
206. Provided that an indemnity agreement exists between the employee and the employer,
then the ultimate penalty will again fall on employees, shareholders and consumers because the
corporation will bear the burden of the fine. It may be suggested that an indemnity clause
should be considered as against public policy and held void. While this suggestion would
appear to remove the problem and allow for monetary sanctions against an individual, in real-
ity courts would have difficulty in policing the relationship between individuals and corpora-
tions. Further, large monetary sanctions would likely result in bankruptcy for the individual.
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ers or consumers. Monetary fines fit more closely to the definition of a
retributive punishment rather than a deterrence, and should be limited
accordingly.
2. Community service or probation
Community service is also a viable tool for punishment but may be
less of a deterrent. Service hours can be imposed on an individual in the
form of his area of expertise or in general service to the community.
2 °7
There is no inherent barrier to imposing community service hours on a
corporation, and a corporation sentenced to community service will pay
its employees to work for the benefit of the community.
In Film Recovery, community service would hardly be a proper pen-
alty. While community service should be used for less egregious con-
duct, it does not deter criminal conduct much more than fines. Both
result in financial losses that can be passed on by the corporation.
Within the boundaries set by the court, community service may be per-
formed when convenient. The actual performance of the penalty does
not connote criminality.208  Community service may require an individ-
Therefore, a monetary sanction against an individual would require the court to police the
relationship between the corporation and the employee and would need to be affordable by the
individual.
207. For a list of individuals who have been sentenced to complete community service
hours for environmental violations, see Wheeler, supra note 185, at 24.
208. The criminal sanction is "the law's ultimate threat." H. PACKER, THE LIMITS OF THE
CRIMINAL SANCTION 250 (1968). Despite the fact that a monetary fine is no greater pecuniary
loss than a civil award, by labeling conduct criminal, society is stating that certain conduct is
important to prevent, requires retribution from offenders, or both. Id. at 31. Therefore, it is
arguable that criminal stigma is a penalty that could deter corporate criminal conduct. Some
commentators urge that labeling corporate conduct as criminal is an effective deterrent. See
Fisse, The Use of Publicity as a Criminal Sanction Against Business Corporations, 8 MELB. U.L.
REv. 107 (1971).
Other commentators urge that publicizing corporate conduct is a waste of a government's
resources. Coffee, supra note 170, at 424-29. Professor Coffee suggested that society cannot
pin a scarlet letter on criminal corporations. Id. at 424.
See also Dowie, supra note 166, at 55. Dowie, in discussing design flaws in the Ford
Pinto, disclosed a Ford intra-office memorandum detailing Ford's own cost-benefit analysis of
an $11 safety improvement which would have made the Pinto less likely to burn upon rear
impact. The memo calculated the potential savings to Ford, as a result of installing the device,
at $49.5 million in civil settlements and legal judgments. The memo also calculated the cost to
Ford of installing the device at $137 million. Therefore, the argument goes, Ford would save
$87.5 million by not installing the safety units. Id. at 51. The memo calculated the dollar
value of human lives lost due to Pinto explosions, the value of serious burn injuries and the
value of the burned automobiles. The memo also estimated the number of Pinto explosions
and casualties and injuries, but the seemingly complete memo does not assign a dollar value for
Ford's loss of business due to negative publicity. Id. The proper conclusion to be drawn is
that Ford did not believe that negative publicity would account for a significant dollar amount,
thus negative publicity was not figured into its cost-benefit analysis. Because criminal stigma
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ual to spend time with youth groups or the aged, which is hardly
equivalent to spending time in jail. Community service would be an ap-
propriate penalty for less culpable actors and for corporations that are
not as blameworthy as other actors.
3. Jail, civil death and equity securities
Jail terms, court ordered dissolutions of corporations and im-
pounding large amounts of equity securities are each cut from the same
cloth-optimal deterrence. The threat of a jail sentence is probably the
most effective deterrent for corporate individuals because liberty is a
prized possession. Civil death through court ordered dissolution is the
most effective deterrent for corporations but pragmatically can only be
applied to a small, close corporation without injuring innocent share-
holders. Condemnation of a sizable portion of a company's ownership
will be the most effective form of deterrence for a large, public corpora-
tion. In Film Recovery, there was no indication that the risk of a jail
sentence was perceived by defendants Rodriguez, Kirschbaum or O'Neil.
However, the risk of a twenty-five year jail term would surely have influ-
enced their corporate decisions regarding worker safety.
Another form of punishment available in cases of serious corporate
misconduct is court ordered dissolution or civil death.2" 9 A state has the
power to punish a corporation by dissolution and by seizing the corpora-
tion's assets.210 However, the practice has not been favored in recent
times.21" ' Blackstone said a corporation may be dissolved and particular
members may be disenfranchised when the entity acts contrary to the
laws of society.212 Blackstone further suggested that lands belonging to
the corporation should revert to the grantors or their heirs under the
fiction of a failed grant.213 Analogizing feudal lands to modem day as-
sets leads to the conclusion that in appropriate cases, a corporation's ma-
chinery and materials should be auctioned for the benefit of the state.
But the court should consider the secondary effects of corporate dis-
would not cause serious negative publicity, it will not cause a significant income loss. See
generally Comment, Is Corporate Criminal Liability Necessary?, supra note 170. Thus the
deterrent value of criminal stigma is uncertain. Due to the tenuousness of criminal stigma as a
deterrent, it should not be relied upon. "[T]he effectiveness of public censure after conviction
as a deterrent force is very debatable in the case of corporations." Id. at 925.
209. See supra note 26.
210. See, e.g., ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 38, § 38-1 (Smith-Hurd 1977), CAL. PENAL CODE
§ 1804 (Vest 1977).
211. Note, supra note 26, at 98.
212. 1 W. BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *484.
213. Id.
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solution on society. For the small, close corporation, these would be
minimal. Their product markets tend to be specialized and any void left
by their dissolution would be quickly filled by an enterprising entrepre-
neur. Even if this were not true, the impact on the labor market and
general product market would be de minimus.
Dissolution of a large, public corporation is likely to affect a greater
number of non-culpable segments of society because they employ more
people and produce more products and services which are utilized by
more people. If the state shuts down a large plant, innocent workers
would lose their jobs, suppliers would lose customers, and consumers
would lose a product source. In short, the damage done in penalizing the
corporation would not mirror the culpability of those affected.
Considering the advantages and disadvantages of court ordered dis-
solution, civil death could serve a limited purpose in deterring criminal
conduct. Courts imposing civil death should take care to ensure that
society does not become the punished victim through job losses or prod-
uct and service unavailability:
As a practical matter, small corporations are dissolved as soon as
their key officials are sentenced to jail. Small corporations may be the
ideal candidates for court ordered dissolution because no more severe
penalty could be handed out; yet, other corporations will be deterred
from violating the law.
As applied to Film Recovery, civil death would have worked to deter
the corporate executives because the individuals would have wanted to
preserve the source of their livelihood. Regardless of any threat to lib-
erty, the threat of civil death will deter corporate criminal conduct.
The best deterrent and punishment for public corporations that
commit wrongful acts is the taking of equity securities.21a First, the
trustee2 15 of the securities will be heard in the management of the corpo-
ration. Second, corporate executives will eventually have to replace man-
agement that exposes the corporation to humiliation through criminal
conduct. Finally, a criminal verdict may aid, or at least stimulate, share-
holder derivative suits against the corporation and the culpable
individuals.
214. For a discussion of the use of equity securities as a punishment, see supra notes 202-04
and accompanying text.
215. A trustee would oversee the condemned securities on behalf of the state. See supra
notes 203-04 and accompanying text.
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V. CONCLUSION
Death at the workplace is not uncommon. Nor is criminal conduct
by corporations. Yet the individuals behind the scenes often go unpun-
ished. People v. Film Recovery Systems, Inc.2 16 can lead jurisprudence
into the modem era by making those who are most culpable criminally
liable for their conduct. What the law needs is a flexible framework to
help judges, prosecutors and corporate managers determine when and
how corporate individuals should be held liable for their criminal
conduct.
Jeffrey P. Grogin
216. Nos. 83-11091, 84-5064 (Cook County Cir. Ct. of I1. June 14, 1985).
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